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SUMMARY
Traditional solutions to information security in communication systems act in
the application layer and are oblivious to the effects in the physical layer. Physical-
layer security methods, of which information-theoretic security is a special case, try
to extract security from the random effects in the physical layer. The wiretap channel
model, where the transmitted symbols can be observed by a legitimate receiver and an
eavesdropper through two different noisy channels, is of special interest in information-
theoretic security. In information-theoretic security, there are two asymptotic notions
of secrecy—weak and strong secrecy.
This dissertation investigates the problem of information-theoretic strong secrecy
on the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC) with a specific focus on designing
practical codes. The codes designed in this work are based on analysis and techniques
from error-correcting codes. In particular, the dual codes of certain low-density parity-
check (LDPC) codes are shown to achieve strong secrecy in a coset coding scheme.
First, we analyze the asymptotic block-error rate of short-cycle-free LDPC codes
when they are transmitted over a binary erasure channel (BEC) and decoded using
the belief propagation (BP) decoder. Under certain conditions, we show that the
asymptotic block-error rate falls according to an inverse square law in block length,
which is shown to be a sufficient condition for the dual codes to achieve strong secrecy.
Next, we construct large-girth LDPC codes using algorithms from graph theory
and show that the asymptotic bit-error rate of these codes follow a sub-exponential
decay as the block length increases, which is a sufficient condition for strong secrecy.
The secrecy rates achieved by the duals of large-girth LDPC codes is shown to be an




Communication systems and wireless networks have been growing very rapidly in the
last few decades. The very nature of wireless systems allows anybody with a radio
receiver to capture signals which may carry sensitive information. In addition, there
is a growing trend among individuals and corporations to store personal and financial
information on the Internet, potentially making it accessible to anybody with an
Internet connection. Therefore, steps need to be taken to make sure that sensitive
information may not be intercepted by malicious parties.
The traditional means of securing information is through cryptography, which is
usually employed at the application layer; this security method is blind to what is hap-
pening at the physical layer. Recently, there has been some research on physical-layer
security to develop techniques that take advantage of the properties of the physical
communication medium to achieve security. There are several approaches to physical-
layer security, and one of them is information-theoretic security. Cryptographic secu-
rity assumes that the eavesdropper of a secure transmission has unlimited access to the
transmission, but a limited processing power; due to this, conventional cryptography
is sometimes also called computational security. On the other hand, information-
theoretic security assumes that the eavesdropper has a limited access to the trans-
mission, but an unlimited power to process it. This aspect of information-theoretic
security is crucial because computation hardware is getting drastically cheaper every
day; this means that computational security schemes that are currently considered
secure will no longer be secure in the future.
For example, the Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption scheme employs a
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56-bit key and was approved as a standard by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards
in 1976. In 1997, a DES cryptogram was broken for the first time in public. In 1998,
the Deep Crack hardware broke a DES key in 56 hours [2]. The time taken to crack
a DES key was reduced to less than 23 hours in 1999 using distributed computing.
As computers keep getting more powerful every day, encryption schemes must also
catch up with them. In this aspect, information-theoretic security is superior because
it always assumes that the attacker has unbounded computing resources.
1.1 Physical-Layer Security
The point-to-point communication system with a single adversary is a fundamental
model for studying information security. In this model, the transmitter sends a secure
message to the legitimate receiver in such a way that the adversary cannot understand
it. The legitimate parties are aware of the presence of the adversary and its abilities.
In any secure communication scheme on the point-to-point communication system,
the legitimate receiver must have some advantage over the adversary that can be used
to achieve security. In the case of symmetric-key cryptography, the legitimate receiver
knows the secret key used by the transmitter, which is unknown to the adversary.
In asymmetric-key cryptography, the legitimate receiver can convey its public key,
which can be verified by the transmitter to be authentic. This is a clear advantage
over the adversary, who cannot mimic the actions of the legitimate receiver.
Any communication system that is deployed in the real world is subject to the ran-
dom nature of physical communication media. These random effects include thermal
(electronic) noise, interference, fading, etc. Suppose the point-to-point communica-
tion system is such that the physical communication medium affects the adversary’s
signal more unfavorably than the legitimate receiver’s signal. In terms of signal qual-







Figure 1: A wireless communication system with an eavesdropper outside the secured
region.
advantage to achieve secure communication between the transmitter and the legiti-
mate receiver is the primary objective of physical-layer security.
1.1.1 Some Motivating Examples
1. Consider a wireless system (Fig. 1) where a transmitter and a legitimate receiver
are located in a secured area, say inside a building, that is inaccessible to an
eavesdropper. The eavesdropper can only listen in on the wireless signal from
outside the secured area, and therefore receives a signal with a lower intensity
than the legitimate receiver.
2. Consider a distributed data-storage system where sensitive information must
be stored in multiple storage nodes at different geographic locations. Once
the data is stored, the system provides on-line access to a legitimate party to
remotely read all the storage nodes. An illegitimate party (eavesdropper), who
does not have on-line access to the nodes, can obtain offline access to some of
the storage nodes. For example, the eavesdropper can bribe the caretaker of a
particular storage node to get access to it. Assuming that the eavesdropper can
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corrupt only a fraction of storage nodes in this manner, the legitimate party
has a physical-layer advantage over the eavesdropper.
Though there are practical situations which can benefit from physical-layer se-
curity, the information-theoretic aspects of it are still not well-understood. Under-
standing the information-theoretic security aspects of simple abstract systems is an
important stepping stone for designing information-theoretically secure practical sys-
tems. In this dissertation, we focus on theoretical scenarios involving abstract system
models.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss some of the fun-
damental ideas in information-theoretic security and give a brief overview of some
of the prior work related to this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we will introduce our
channel model and our strong secrecy goal. We will also show in Chapter 3 that we
can solve our strong secrecy problem by solving a related channel-coding problem. In
the next two chapters, we will discuss two of our solutions to the related channel cod-
ing problem. Chapter 4 discusses our solution involving short-cycle-free low-density
parity-check (LDPC) codes, where we show that LDPC codes without cycles of length
two or four, and minimum left degree more than two can be used to construct a cod-
ing scheme that achieves strong secrecy on our channel model. In Chapter 5, we show
that LDPC codes with girth growing logarithmically in block length can be used to
achieve strong secrecy. Finally, we summarize our contributions and outline some





In this chapter, we summarize the basic ideas in information-theoretic security and
discuss works that are closely related to this dissertation. In the first section, we
give a quick overview of the definitions in information theory with regard to discrete
random variables. In the next section, we summarize the notions of information-
theoretic security on the wiretap channel. In the later sections, we will discuss some
of the prior works regarding wiretap channels and secrecy coding for wiretap channels.
2.1 Information Theory—Basic Definitions
In this dissertation, we will deal with only discrete random variables, i.e., random
variables distributed over a finite alphabet. This section summarizes the definitions
in information theory that will be used in the subsequent chapters. These definitions
are narrow in scope since our random variables are all discrete. For a more general
discussion, we refer the reader to the book by Cover and Thomas [3].
Definition 2.1 (Shannon Entropy). Given a discrete random variable X taking val-
ues in a finite alphabet X according to the probability distribution pX(x), the Shan-




where we set 0 log2 0 to 0 (strictly speaking, the summation is over the values for
which pX(x) > 0). ▼
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Intuitively, the Shannon entropy H(X) is a quantitative measure of the random-
ness in X. In this dissertation, we call Shannon entropy as just “entropy.”
Definition 2.2 (Conditional Entropy). Given two random variables X and Y taking
values in finite alphabets X and Y, respectively, the conditional entropy H(Y ∣X) is
defined as
H(Y ∣X) = ∑
x∈X
pX(x)H(Y ∣X = x)
where H(Y ∣X = x) is the entropy of Y calculated using the conditional probability
distribution pY ∣X(y∣x) over y ∈ Y. ▼
The conditional entropy H(Y ∣X) is the measure of the randomness in Y given the
knowledge of X.
Definition 2.3 (Mutual Information). The mutual information between two discrete
random variables X and Y is defined as
I(X;Y ) = H(X) −H(X ∣Y )
▼
The mutual information I(X;Y ), which is a symmetric function, is the amount of
information obtained about X by observing Y (and vice versa).
2.2 Information-theoretic Secrecy
The focus of this dissertation is the wiretap channel model, a generalized version of
which is depicted in Fig. 2. This system consists of three parties,
1. Alice—the transmitter









Figure 2: The generalized wiretap system model.
Eve is a “passive” eavesdropper in the sense that she cannot influence Alice or the
channel in any way. This is one of the fundamental models used in classical cryptog-
raphy and in information-theoretic security. It is important to note that the current
works in classical cryptography consider fairly advanced attack models where the
attacker can control the channel and also influence the transmitter. In fact, there
are practical cryptographic schemes that provide security even in such models in-
volving powerful adversaries. However, the area of information-theoretic security has
not yet advanced to a sufficiently mature level to consider models involving powerful
attackers.
Information-theoretic security usually considers the case where the wiretap chan-
nel is memoryless, and has discrete input alphabet and a discrete output alphabet.
The input alphabet is X , and the output alphabets are Y and Z for Bob and Eve,
respectively. The alphabets X ,Y and Z are finite. For a memoryless channel, suc-
cessive transmissions are independent of each other and the channel is defined by its
joint transition probability pY Z∣X(y, z∣x).
Alice has a secret message S, uniformly distributed over a discrete alphabet S,
that she wants to convey to Bob through the wiretap channel in such a way that Eve
cannot obtain S. To this end, Alice encodes S into a cryptogram Xn, which is an
n-symbol vector over X , and transmits it over the channel. In this case, the block
7




The encoder and the channel characteristic pY Z∣X are assumed to be publicly
known, i.e., Eve’s knowledge about the channel and the encoder is as good as Bob’s.
Alice’s objective is to design the encoder such that the following objectives are met.
1. Reliability: Bob should be able to decode the secret S from his observation
Y n.
2. Secrecy: Eve should not be able to obtain S from her observation Zn.
The precise definition of “secrecy” is the difference between cryptography and
information-theoretic security. In cryptography, secrecy is defined in terms of the
(infeasible) amount of computation required on Eve’s part to decode S from Zn. In
the information-theoretic approach, secrecy is defined in terms of the mutual infor-
mation between the secret and Eve’s observation. Even under the information theory
umbrella, there are different definitions of secrecy, namely, Shannon perfect secrecy,
strong secrecy, and weak secrecy.
Definition 2.4 (Perfect Secrecy). An encoder for the wiretap model achieves perfect
secrecy in Shannon’s sense if the probability of error in Bob’s estimate Ŝ is zero and
the mutual information between Eve’s observation Zn and the secret S is zero; that
is,
Pr(Ŝ ≠ S) = 0 (Reliability)
I(S;Zn) = 0 (Secrecy)
Equivalently, perfect secrecy is said to be achieved if the a priori probability distri-
bution of S is the same as Eve’s a posteriori probability distribution of S. ▼
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2.2.1 Asymptotic Secrecy
Even when abstract wiretap models are considered, the above perfect secrecy criterion
is achieved only in very few cases. The definition of perfect secrecy considers a single
encoder En and a single secret message alphabet S. In contrast, the notions weak
and strong secrecy are asymptotic notions that consider a sequence of constant-rate
encoders (Enk)k∈N with increasing block lengths (nk) and message alphabets (Snk).
For simplicity, the subscript k can be dropped. Since the rates of the encoders are all




, ∀n ∈ {nk}
For a given encoder block length n, the asymptotic notions of secrecy consider the
case where the message S, which is distributed uniformly over the message alphabet
Sn, is encoded using En into an n-symbol vector Xn and transmitted over the wiretap
channel. The reliability criterion of the encoder sequence is specified in an asymptotic
manner.
Definition 2.5 (Reliability). An encoder sequence (En), with constant rate and in-
creasing block length n, is said to achieve reliability on the wiretap channel if there
exists a sequence of decoders (Dn) for which the probability of error in Bob’s estimate
Ŝ ≜ Dn(Y n) of the secret S obeys
lim
n→∞
Pr (S ≠ Ŝ) = 0
In other words, the probability that Bob decodes the message incorrectly goes to zero
as n increases. ▼
Definition 2.6 (Weak Secrecy). An encoder sequence (En), with constant rate and
increasing block length n, is said to achieve weak secrecy on the wiretap channel if
it achieves reliability, and the mutual information between Eve’s observation Zn and
9






That is, the rate of information leakage to Eve converges to zero as n increases. ▼
Definition 2.7 (Strong Secrecy). The encoder sequence (En), with constant rate and
increasing block length n, is said to achieve strong secrecy on the wiretap channel if
it achieves reliability, and the mutual information between Eve’s observation Zn and




That is, the amount of information leaked to Eve goes to zero as n increases. ▼
A secret information rate R is said to be achievable with strong (weak) secrecy
on the wiretap channel if there exists a sequence of encoders of rate R that achieve
strong (weak) secrecy.
Definition 2.8 (Secrecy Capacity). The strong secrecy capacity C̄s of the wiretap
channel is the supremum of all possible information rates R that are achievable with
strong secrecy. The weak secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the supremum of all
possible information rates that are achievable with weak secrecy. ▼
2.3 Historical Background
2.3.1 Perfect Secrecy using a Secret Key
The idea of using information theory to analyze cryptosystems was first introduced by
Shannon in his 1949 paper. In [4], Shannon considers the system model illustrated in
Fig. 3. Prior to transmission, Alice and Bob share a secret key K, which is a random
variable distributed over a set of finite values. The key K is not revealed to Eve.









Figure 3: A schematic of Shannon’s secrecy system
i.e., Xn = Y n = Zn. The encoder En uses both K and S as inputs and outputs the
codeword Xn. Shannon showed that perfect secrecy on this model can be achieved
only if
H(K) ≥ H(S)
In other words, perfect secrecy can be achieved only if the secret key is at least as
long as the secret message.
To achieve perfect secrecy on this model, Alice may encode S using Vernam’s
cipher, also known as the one-time pad [5]. For example, when S and K are inde-
pendent uniformly distributed n-bit random vectors, the one-time pad encoder will
output Xn = S ⊕K, where ⊕ denotes the bit-wise exclusive-OR operation. Given K,
Bob can easily decode S from Xn. Eve, on the other hand, does not know K and the
amount of information leaked to her by Xn is zero, i.e., I(S;Xn) = 0.
However, we note that secure schemes that use a secret key require an addi-
tional channel to transmit the key. The channel for the secret key is assumed to
be completely off-limits to the eavesdropper, and such a channel may not exist in
certain scenarios. This additional requirement is not present most of the schemes in











Figure 4: A schematic of Wyner’s wiretap model.
2.3.2 Secrecy Capacity of Wiretap Channels
Degraded Wiretap Channels
The idea of analyzing cryptosystems with noise was introduced by Wyner in his 1975
paper on wiretap channels [6]. Wyner’s wiretap model, illustrated in Fig. 4, consists
of a discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) for both Bob and Eve, with Eve’s channel
being a degraded version of Bob’s channel; in other words, Xn → Y n → Zn forms a
Markov chain. Wyner showed that whenever the channel capacity CM of the main
channel is more than the channel capacity CMW of the wiretap channel (i.e., the
capacity of the cascade of DMC 1 and DMC 2), the weak secrecy capacity Cs of the
wiretap model is positive. In particular, he showed [6, Thm. 3] that
Cs = max
pX∈P(Cs)
(I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z))
≥ CM −CMW
where P(Cs) represents the set of all distributions pX on the single channel input X
for which I(X;Y ) ≥ Cs.
Non-degraded Wiretap Channels
Csiszár and Körner [7] generalized Wyner’s model to cases where Eve’s observation
Zn need not be a degraded version of Bob’s observation Y n. For their channel model,














(I(V ;Y ) − I(V ;Z))
where V is an auxiliary random variable such that V → X → (Y,Z) forms a Markov
chain and the maximization in the above expression is done over all such V . In [8],
Körner and Marton introduced the notion of one channel being “less noisy” than
another channel—channel 1, given by X → Y , is said to be less noisy than channel 2,
given by X → Z, if
I(V ;Y ) ≥ I(V ;Z)
for all V → X → (Y,Z). Under this notion, Csiszár and Körner proved [7, Thm. 3]
that whenever the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Alice
to Eve, the weak secrecy capacity is given by
Cs = max
pX
(I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z))
From Weak to Strong Secrecy
In the early years of the research on wiretap channels, the weak secrecy notion intro-
duced by Wyner [6] was in predominant use. It can be seen that a scheme with weak
secrecy can leak asymptotically unbounded amount of information, even though the
leakage rate may be zero. For example, the amount of leaked information can scale
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as n1−δ for arbitrarily small δ > 0; here the information leakage is unbounded while
the leakage rate goes to zero. Due to this, Csiszár [9], and, independently, Maurer
and Wolf [10] defined the notion of strong secrecy, and argued that this is a much
better security condition compared to weak secrecy. In [9], it was proved that the
technique of the earlier work by Csiszár and Körner [7], which focuses on achieving
weak secrecy, actually leads to strong secrecy. In [10], Maurer and Wolf proposed a
generic procedure to derive a strongly secret scheme from a weakly secret one using
extractors [11,12]. The key result of these two works is that for any wiretap channel,
the weak secrecy capacity Cs is equal to its strong secrecy capacity C̄s.
2.4 Wiretap Codes
Until recently, the majority of the work on wiretap channels used non-constructive
methods like the random-coding argument to show the existence of methods to achieve
secrecy capacity. In particular, they did not provide explicit construction of encoders
or wiretap codes to achieve secrecy, even at rates below the secrecy capacity. For
example, Wyner [6, §V] uses a random-coding argument to prove his main result,
while Csiszár and Körner [7, §IV] use an argument based on typical sequences.
Historically, the first explicit construction of wiretap codes was done in a slightly
modified version of the wiretap channel with combinatorial constraints. For proba-
bilistic channels, there are currently two approaches to secrecy coding—the LDPC
code based approach, and the polar coding approach.
2.4.1 Wiretap Channel with Combinatorial Constraints
While the works of Wyner, and Csiszár and Körner are concerned with a discrete
memoryless wiretap channel, the work by Ozarow and Wyner [13] considers a wiretap
model with a combinatorial constraint. This channel, called a type-II wiretap channel,
has a noiseless binary link between Alice and Bob such that a constant fraction of
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the transmitted bits are leaked to Eve. That is, if n bits are transmitted over the
channel and α is the leakage fraction, Eve is allowed to see µ = αn of the n transmitted
bits. Alice knows only the fraction α, but not the bit positions seen by Eve. Given
the parameter α, the secrecy capacity of the type-II wiretap channel is Cs = 1 − α.
Ozarow and Wyner proved [13, Thms. 2 & 3] that it is possible to achieve the weak
secrecy capacity of the type-II wiretap channel using a coset coding scheme. They
also showed [13, Thm. 4] that there exists a coset coding based wiretap code that
asymptotically leaks at most one bit to Eve; this result is stronger than the weak
secrecy notion and only slightly weaker than the strong secrecy notion.
Unlike the probabilistic channels of [6,7], it is possible to achieve perfect secrecy on
channels with combinatorial constraints. Wei [14] introduced the notion of generalized
Hamming weight of linear codes and related it to the problem of achieving perfect
secrecy on the type-II wiretap channel using coset coding.
Secret Sharing Schemes
In the cryptography community, a version of the type-II wiretap problem was studied
under the name secret sharing scheme. The first constructions of secret sharing
schemes were the ones by Blakley [15] and Shamir [16]. They studied the problem of
distributing a secret among n parties such that a cooperation of any k − 1 of them
cannot recover the secret whereas coalitions of any k of them can. McEliece and
Sarwate [17] showed that Shamir’s scheme was equivalent to coset coding with a
Reed-Solomon code.
In [18], Karnin, et al. generalized Shamir’s threshold scheme to ramp secret sharing
schemes. Here, a d-symbol long secret is broken into n different pieces so that any
k − d pieces or fewer do not give any information about the secret, whereas any k
pieces give complete information about the secret. In the same work, it was also
shown that any ramp scheme corresponds to a maximum distance separable code [19].
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In a secret sharing scheme, the subsets of pieces that can recover the secret are
called access sets, the subsets that convey no information about the secret are called
non-access sets, and the remaining subsets are called semi-access sets. Under this
terminology, Blakley and Shamir considered the case where all the subsets of size k
are access sets and there are no semi-access sets; Karnin, et al. considered the case
where sets of size k or more are access sets, sets of size k − d or less are non-access
sets and the remaining sets are semi-access sets.
The secret sharing problem was further generalized by Brickell and Davenport [20]
and Kurosawa, et al. [21] to include access sets of more general structures. Under this
framework, the secret sharing problem was linked [21] to combinatorial objects called
matroids [22]. Massey [23, 24] studied secret sharing schemes based on puncturing
linear codes and showed that the access structures in this scheme are related to the
minimal codewords of the underlying linear code.
2.4.2 The LDPC Code Approach
The first explicit code construction for probabilistic channels was done by Thangaraj,
et al. [1] using LDPC codes, where they consider a noiseless main channel and a binary
erasure channel for the wiretapper. They use the coset coding scheme of [6,13] using
the duals of LDPC codes and show that this scheme achieves weak secrecy at rates
close to secrecy capacity. The security mechanism of their technique is based on the
threshold effect of LDPC codes—when the limiting performance of LDPC codes over
a noisy channel is studied by varying the channel parameter, the asymptotic block-
error rate suddenly drops from a non-zero value to zero. The approach in [1] was
later extended to certain cases where the main channel is also noisy [25,26].
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2.4.3 The Polar Coding Approach
A new class of channel codes, called polar codes, were recently invented by Arıkan [27].
For a given binary input symmetric output channel, Arıkan showed that the polar
codes designed for that channel achieve the channel capacity. The basic mechanism
behind their capacity achieving property is channel polarization—by transforming n
bits using a carefully chosen linear transformation and transmitting them over the
channel, a portion of the bits (“bad” bits) can be made to appear as if they are
transmitted through a pure-noise channel and the remaining bits (“good” bits) can
be made to appear as if they are transmitted through a noiseless channel. The polar
code is defined by assigning a preset value to the bad bits and transmitting the
message using the good bits. It was shown in [27] that the fraction of the good bits
approaches the capacity of the channel, which directly means that polar codes are
capacity achieving.
The idea of designing wiretap codes using channel polarization was published by
several research groups almost simultaneously, namely, by Mahdavifar and Vardy [28,
29], Andersson, et al. [30], Hof and Shamai [31], and Koyluoglu and El Gamal [32].
The polar coding technique for wiretap codes can be outlined as follows.
1. Transmit the secret message on bit positions that are good for Bob, but bad for
Eve.
2. Transmit uniform independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random bits
on bit positions that are good for both Bob and Eve.
3. Transmit zeros on bit positions that are bad for both Bob and Eve.
The above technique works because of the channel capacity achieving property of
polar codes. The i.i.d. random bits are transmitted at a rate close to Eve’s channel
capacity and they can be perfectly decoded by Eve using a successive cancellation
decoder [27]. This means that Eve’s channel cannot carry any significant information
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about the secret message since it would be a violation of Shannon’s Noisy-Channel
Coding Theorem [33].
In the aforementioned works on the polar coding technique, it was shown that
this technique achieves the entire rate-equivocation region of degraded binary-input
symmetric-output wiretap channels. In particular, their schemes achieve weak se-
crecy at rates close to the secrecy capacity. For the case of non-degraded wiretap
channels and non-symmetric wiretap channels, this technique achieves weak secrecy,
but at rates away from the secrecy capacity. Among these works, the technique of
Mahdavifar and Vardy [29] is unique because it achieves strong secrecy for wiretap
models with a noiseless main channel at rates arbitrarily close to secrecy capacity.
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CHAPTER III
STRONG SECRECY OVER THE BINARY ERASURE
WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this dissertation, we are concerned with the problem of designing encoders for
achieving strong secrecy on the binary erasure wiretap channel (BEWC) model. In
this chapter, we will introduce the BEWC model and do an information-theoretic
analysis of the coset coding scheme for this model. We will then show (Lemma 3.3)
that the duals of certain “good” channel codes for an appropriate binary erasure
channel (BEC) can be used in a coset coding scheme to achieve strong secrecy on the
BEWC.
3.1 System Model and Motivation
3.1.1 Binary Erasure Wiretap Channel Model
The BEWC model is a special case of the wiretap channel model introduced in Sec-
tion 2.2. The BEWC model (Fig. 6), first studied by Thangaraj, et al. [1], consists
of two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, who want to communicate in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper, Eve. The channel between Alice and Bob is a noiseless
binary channel. The channel between Alice and Eve, denoted by BEC(ξ), is a BEC
with erasure probability ξ. A bit sent through a BEC is either received unmodified
or is erased. Whenever an erasure occurs, the channel outputs the erasure symbol
‘?’. The BEC is a memoryless channel, which means that bits sent successively are
erased independently.
In the BEWC model, Alice’s secret S is a random variable uniformly distributed











Figure 6: The binary erasure wiretap channel model.
revealing it to Eve. In order to do this, Alice uses an encoder En to convert S into an
n-bit random variable Xn and then transmits Xn over the BEWC. The rate of the







The encoder En is known both to Bob and Eve. In our research, we focus on achieving
asymptotic secrecy and we consider a sequence (Snk ,Enk)k∈N of message alphabet and
encoder pairs such that the encoder rates are lower-bounded by R > 0 and the block
length nk increases monotonically with k. The subscript k is present because the
block length n need not increase in increments of one and its purpose is strictly to
make the definition of the alphabet-encoder sequence precise. In order to make the
notation easier, we will drop the subscript k and denote to the alphabet-encoder
sequence using (Sn,En).
3.1.2 Application of BEWC Analysis to Other Channel Models
In our work, we study the BEWC model because it is a fundamental model and its
analysis is extendable to a lot of different wiretap models. For example, Rathi, et
al. [25] consider the wiretap model where the main channel and the wiretap chan-








(a) A binary-input memoryless channel.
(b) An equivalent degraded binary erasure channel.
Figure 7: The decomposition of a BMC (a) into a degraded BEC (b).
Moreover, any wiretap model with a noiseless main channel and a binary-input mem-
oryless channel (BMC) for the wiretapper can be modeled as a degraded BEWC. This
is possible because of the Erasure Decomposition Lemma [34, Lemma 4.78] and its
generalization [35, Prop. 6.4] to non-symmetric channels. According to this lemma,
any BMC can be considered as the cascade of an appropriate BEC and an appropriate
DMC.
For example, Channel 1 in Fig. 7, which is an arbitrary BMC, can be represented
as the result of a cascade of Channel 2, a BEC, and Channel 3, a DMC. Consider the
wiretap model where the main channel is noiseless and the wiretapper’s channel is
Channel 1 (Fig. 8a). To achieve strong (weak) secrecy on this wiretap model, we may
use encoders that achieve strong (weak) secrecy on the BEWC model with Channel
2 as the wiretapper’s channel (Fig. 8b). These encoders achieve I(S; Z̃n) → 0 (or
alternatively 1nI(S; Z̃
n) → 0 for weak secrecy). Since Xn → Z̃n → Zn forms a Markov
chain, we have the following well-known data-processing inequality.
I(Xn; Z̃n) ≥ I(Xn;Zn) (1)
From the above inequality, one can immediately see that codes that are designed to
achieve strong (weak) secrecy on the BEWC model in Fig. 8b also achieve strong








Figure 8: A wiretap model with a BMC wiretapper (a) and its corresponding BEWC
model (b) based on the Erasure Decomposition Lemma.
It is important to note that the above approach to secrecy coding for BMC wiretap
models cannot achieve secrecy capacity. In our example (Fig. 8), we see that I(Xn;Zn)
is bounded away from I(Xn; Z̃n), except for trivial cases like when Channel 3 is





is strictly greater than that of the BEWC model in Fig. 8b, which is given by
C̃s = max
PX
(H(X) − I(X; Z̃))
Though the BEWC approach to achieving secrecy on BMC wiretaps is sub-optimal
in terms of achievable rates, it is useful because we do not have to do any additional
analysis of the BMC wiretap model.
3.1.3 Our Research Goal
The goal of our research is to design encoders (En) for Alice such that we are able
to achieve strong secrecy on the BEWC model. Mathematically, the conditions for
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strong secrecy are
1. There must exist a decoder for Bob such that estimate Ŝ of the secret message
S must have a vanishing probability of (block) error. That is,
Pr (Ŝ ≠ S)→ 0 as n→∞
2. The mutual information between Eve’s observation Zn and the secret message
S must vanish as the block length increases. That is,
I(S;Zn)→∞ as n→∞
3.2 The Coset Coding Scheme
The sequence of encoders (En) to be used in the BEWC model must have rate at
least R. In the classical channel or source coding scenario, the case where the En’s are
deterministic encoders or, equivalently, functions is usually considered. In contrast to
deterministic encoders, stochastic encoders are not functions and have many possible
outputs for a given input. In particular, given an input vector s, a stochastic encoder
En is such that its output En(s) is a random variable. In the secrecy coding scenario,
deterministic encoders, in general, have a poorer secrecy performance compared to
stochastic encoders. Due to this reason, almost all secrecy coding works deal only
with stochastic encoders. In our work, we will be doing the same.
In the secrecy coding problem, Alice must not only keep the message S hidden
from Eve; she must also reliably convey it to Bob. Therefore, we only consider
stochastic encoders En for which the set of possible values of the random variables
En(s) and En(s̃) are disjoint for s ≠ s̃. In this case, the set of possible output vectors of
the encoder En can be partitioned (Fig. 9) into different subsets such that all vectors
in the a single subset correspond to only one possible input vector. Clearly, such













. Codebook for 
Figure 9: The partitioning of the set of all possible output vectors of a stochastic
encoder En according to the input message. Each horizontal bold line represents an
output codeword.
decoder with
Pr (Ŝ ≠ S) = 0
3.2.1 Binary Linear Block Codes—Background
For integers n and k with 0 ≤ k ≤ n, an (n, k) binary linear block code C is a k-
dimensional vector subspace of the n-dimensional vector space Fn2 over the binary
field F2 ≜ {0,1}. The number n is called the length or the block length of the code C.
The rate of the code C is defined as the ratio k/n. Due to its linearity, the code C can
be defined as the row space of a carefully chosen k × n binary matrix G. That is,
C = {mG ∶ m ∈ Fk2}
The matrix G is called a generator matrix of C. The code C can also be defined as
the null-space or kernel of an appropriate (n − k) × n binary matrix H. That is,
C = {x ∈ Fn2 ∶ HxT = 0}
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In such a case, H is called a parity-check matrix of C. Note that the parity-check
matrix and the generator matrix are not necessarily unique for a given code.
3.2.2 Description
In our research, we will be using a class of stochastic encoding schemes called coset
coding schemes. A coset coding scheme, which was introduced by Wyner [6], is based
on a linear code and its cosets. Given the block length n and the rate R of the coset
coding scheme, a binary linear block code C of block length n and rate 1−R is used as
a starting point. This code is a linear subspace of the n-dimensional vector space Fn2
over the binary field F2 ≜ {0,1}. The code C has dimension n(1 − R) and therefore it
has 2nR different cosets. Let C0,C1, . . .C2nR−1 be the cosets of C. The input S to the
coset coding scheme is an nR-bit vector. Let s0, s1, . . . , s2nR−1 be the possible values
for S (we will discuss how the possible messages are indexed in the next paragraph).
Given S = si, the coset coding scheme outputs a vector Xn, chosen uniformly at
random from the coset Ci.
Let H be the parity-check matrix of the linear code C. The matrix H is a (nR)-
by-n binary matrix. Any n-bit vector cn is a codeword in C if and only if it satisfies
the system of parity-check equations given in the matrix form by
cn HT = 0
For any binary vector xn, the nR-bit vector xnHT is called the syndrome of xn with
respect to H. It can be easily seen that two binary vectors xn and x̃n belong to the
same coset of C if and only if they have the same syndrome. Based on this, cosets
can be labeled according to their syndrome. For example, the coset corresponding to
the input message S = si is Ci = {xn ∈ Fn2 ∶ xn HT = si}.
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3.2.3 Equivocation Analysis Under Erasures
Given the output vector Xn of the coset coding scheme, we can find its input S
without ambiguity since the cosets {Ci} are mutually disjoint. Suppose we receive a
vector Zn which is an erasure degraded version of Xn. The number and the position
of these erasures may be random. Denote the set {1,2, . . . , n} using [n]. Let J be
the random vector containing the indices of the erased bits and let j be a particular
instance of J . We have the following observation due to Ozarow and Wyner [13].
Lemma 3.1 ( [13, Lemma 4]). For an index set j ⊆ [n] , I(S;Zn∣J = j) = 0 if and
only if
rank(G[n]/j) = n − ∣j∣
Here, G[n]/j denotes the sub-matrix of G constructed using the columns indexed
by [n] ∖ j. The above lemma means that given an instance J of erasures in Zn, the
message S remains completely secret if and only if the submatrix G[n]/J correspond-
ing to the revealed bits has full rank. Whenever this happens, the bits corresponding
to the revealed positions in Zn cycle through all 2n−∣J ∣ possibilities in the linear code
C. That is, the projection of C onto the bit positions in [n]/J is the entire space
Fn−∣J ∣. This immediately means that in each coset Ci of the code C, the bits corre-
sponding to the revealed bit-positions cycle through all possibilities. Therefore, given
the observation Zn, all cosets of C will have the same number of vectors that match
with Zn, which means that I(S;Zn) = 0.
Example 3.2. Consider the coset coding scheme using the linear code C defined by










1 0 1 0 1









The code C has block length n = 5, dimension two and eight ( = 25−2) cosets. There-
fore, the coset coding scheme will take eight possible messages, each message si being
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1 1 10 0
1 1 10 0
1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 00 0
1 1 10 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 10 1
1 1 00 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 00 1
1 1 00 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 10 0
1 0 10 0
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 00 0
1 0 10 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 10 1
1 0 00 0
1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 00 1
1 0 00 1
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
Figure 10: Example 3.2: An illustration of the cosets and the corresponding secret
messages.
a 3-bit vector, and it will output a 5-bit vector Xn. The cosets of C and the corre-
sponding secret messages are illustrated in Fig. 10.
Suppose the secret message S = s3 = [0 1 1]. To transmit this secret message, the
coset coding scheme based on C will select the coset C3 and output a random vector
from it as Xn. In this example, suppose Xn = [0 1 1 0 1]. To illustrate the reasoning
behind Lemma 3.1, consider two different cases.
 Suppose Zn is the erased version of the output vector Xn with the first, second
and fifth bits erased. That is, J = {1,2,5} and Zn = [? ? 1 0 ?]. The submatrix




















and it has full rank. We can also see (Fig. 11) that for this case, each coset
contains exactly one vector that matches with the observation Zn = [? ? 1 0 ?].
In this case, Zn does not reveal which three-bit pattern is intended as the secret
S.
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1 1 10 0
1 1 10 0
1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 00 0
1 1 10 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 10 1
1 1 00 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 00 1
1 1 00 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 10 0
1 0 10 0
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 00 0
1 0 10 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 10 1
1 0 00 0
1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 00 1
1 0 00 1
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
Figure 11: Example 3.2: The vectors matching the observation Zn = [? ? 1 0 ?].
 Now suppose Zn = [0 ? ? ? 1], that is, the second, third and fourth bits are




















and it does not have full rank. Moreover, only four out of the eight cosets
match the observation Zn. Therefore, some amount of information about S is
revealed by Zn. In particular, note from Fig. 12 that the last bit of S is leaked
by Zn. ▼
3.3 From Secrecy Codes to Channel Codes
3.3.1 Equivocation Analysis for the BEWC
Suppose the coset coding scheme using the linear code C is used to send a secret
message over BEWC(ξ). Let us analyze the amount of information leaked to Eve
through her observation Zn. Let J be the index set of the erased bits in Eve’s
received vector. The vector J is a random vector dictated by the erasure probability
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1 1 10 0
1 1 10 0
1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 00 0
1 1 10 1
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 1 10 1
1 1 00 0
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
1 1 00 1
1 1 00 1
1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 0 10 0
1 0 10 0
1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 0 00 0
1 0 10 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
1 0 10 1
1 0 00 0
1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 00 1
1 0 00 1
1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
Figure 12: Example 3.2: The vectors matching the observation Zn = [0 ? ? ? 1].
ξ. Let F be the event that G[n]/J has full-rank and F̄ be the complementary event.
We can now write the following.
I(S;Zn) = Pr(F ) I(S;Zn∣F ) + Pr(F̄ ) I(S;Zn∣F̄ )
By Lemma 3.1, the conditional mutual information I(S;Zn∣F ) is zero. The condi-
tional mutual information I(S;Zn∣F̄ ) can be upper bounded by the entropy of the
secret, that is
I(S;Zn∣F̄ ) ≤ H(S) = nR
Therefore, we have
I(S;Zn) ≤ n R Pr(F̄ ) (2)
3.3.2 A Channel Coding Problem
Now, consider the channel coding problem involving the binary erasure channel with
erasure probability 1 − ξ and the dual of the code C. The dual code C⊥ is defined as
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the set of all n-bit vectors orthogonal to C. That is,
C⊥ ≜ {x ∈ Fn2 ∶ x ⋅ c = 0,∀c ∈ C}
where x ⋅ c is the dot product of the vectors x and c. The code C⊥ is a (n,nR) binary
linear code.
Suppose a uniformly distributed nR-bit message is encoded using C⊥ and the re-
sulting n-bit codeword is transmitted over BEC(1 − ξ). Let Ẑn be the output of the
channel with Ĵ being the index set of the revealed bits (unerased bits) in the channel
output. In the previous section, we transmitted n-bits through BEC(ξ) and denoted
the index set of the erased bits by J . We can easily see that J and Ĵ are identically
distributed random variables.
It can be immediately seen that the generator matrix G of the code C is also the
parity-check matrix of the dual code C⊥. The parity-check equation for the encoded
word X̂ is given by
G X̂T = 0
⇒GĴ X̂Ĵ + G[n]/Ĵ X̂[n]/Ĵ = 0
⇒G[n]/Ĵ X̂[n]/Ĵ = GĴ X̂Ĵ (3)
Since Ĵ corresponds to the revealed bit-positions in Ẑn, the right hand-side of (3)
is a known vector. The maximum-a-posteriori decoder for the erasure channel must
solve (3) for the unknown vector X̂[n]/Ĵ . There is a unique solution to this equation if
and only if the sub-matrix G[n]/Ĵ has full rank. Let F̂ be the even that G[n]/Ĵ has full
rank. Let us denote the probability of decoder failure under maximum a posteriori
(MAP) decoding by PMAPB (C
⊥,1 − ξ), where the first parameter denotes the code used
over the BEC and the second parameter denotes the erasure probability of the BEC.
We immediately note the following
Pr(F̂ ) = 1 − PMAPB (C
⊥,1 − ξ)
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Since the event F in the previous section and the event F̂ are identically distributed,
we may substitute the above equation in (2) to get
I(S;Zn) ≤ n R Pr(F̄ ) = n R Pr(
¯̂
F )
⇒ I(S;Zn) ≤ n R PMAPB (C
⊥,1 − ξ) (4)
For k ∈ N, suppose we have a sequence of binary linear codes (Cnk) with block
length nk increasing monotonically as k increases, such that the codes have a constant
rate 1 − R. In order to make the notation easier, we drop the subscript k and denote
the sequence of codes by Cn. Suppose we use these codes in the coset coding scheme
to transmit a secret message over BEWC(ξ), for arbitrary ξ ∈ [0,1]. We have the
following sufficient condition for strong secrecy.
Lemma 3.3. The coset coding scheme using the sequence (Cn) achieves strong secrecy
on BEWC(ξ) whenever the asymptotic block-error probability of the dual sequence (C⊥n)
over BEC(1 − ξ) decays as
PMAPB (C
⊥




From the union bound, we know that for any code over any channel, we have
Pr(bit-error) ≤ Pr(block-error) ≤ n Pr(bit-error)
We have the following sufficient condition using the above bound.
Lemma 3.4. The coset coding scheme using the sequence (Cn) achieves strong secrecy
on BEWC(ξ) whenever the asymptotic bit-error rate (BER) of the dual sequence (C⊥n)
over BEC(1 − ξ) decays as
PMAPb (C
⊥




Note that the above sufficient condition involves the MAP decoder. Since MAP
decoding is optimal, PMAPB can be upper bounded by the block-error probability under
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any suboptimal decoder. Therefore, the duals of codes whose block-error probability
under suboptimal decoding decays as O(1/n2) will achieve strong secrecy on the
BEWC when used in a coset coding scheme. In the next two chapters, we will
describe two codes which have this property.
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CHAPTER IV
SHORT-CYCLE-FREE LDPC CODES FOR STRONG
SECRECY
The objective of our research is to design coding schemes to achieve strong secrecy
on the BEWC model. In Chapter 3, we showed that this problem can be reduced
to the problem of finding a sequence of binary linear block codes whose block-error
probability on the BEC decays as 1/n2 as the block length n increases. In this chapter,
we will discuss our strong secrecy result using short-cycle-free LDPC codes. We study
the block-error probability of LDPC codes under belief propagation (BP) decoding
by analyzing its stopping sets. The key result in this chapter is that LDPC codes
with minimum variable node degree at least three and girth at least six (hence called
“short-cycle-free”) have a BP block-error probability that decays as 1/n2. The work
discussed in this chapter was presented in [36,37].
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, we give a quick overview
of LDPC codes and discuss some of the results involving stopping sets of LDPC codes
that form the basis of the our work. In the next section, we provide an overview of
the key ideas in our result. In the third and fourth sections, we prove our main
result. In the final section, we describe the strong secrecy region achieved by using
short-cycle-free LDPC codes.
4.1 Fundamentals of LDPC Codes
LDPC codes are linear error-correcting codes introduced by Gallager in his thesis [38].
After their original discovery in the 1960’s, these codes were forgotten for a few
decades until their rediscovery in the 1990’s. In this section, we will give a brief
33
Figure 13: A parity-check matrix and its corresponding Tanner graph representation.
introduction to LDPC codes, with sufficient details to follow the remainder of this
chapter. Most of the material in this section is based the notation and presentation
from the book Modern Coding Theory by Richardson and Urbanke [34]. The material
on stopping sets (§ 4.1.4) is based on the paper by Orlitsky, et al. [39].
Definition 4.1 (Tanner graph). Given the (n − k) × n parity-check matrix H of a
binary linear code C, the Tanner graph corresponding to C is a bipartite multigraph
G with the vertex bipartition V (G) = Vv ∪ Vc such that
 The set Vv has n variable nodes, with each node vi representing a codeword bit
xi in C.
 The set Vc has (n − k) check nodes, with each node cj representing a row hj of
the parity-check matrix H of C.
 There is an edge between a variable node vi and a check node cj if and only if
the codeword bit xi corresponding to vi appears in the parity-check equation
corresponding to the row hj represented by cj. ▼
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Fig. 13 shows a parity-check matrix and its corresponding Tanner graph. In
this dissertation, we will allow Tanner graphs with multiple edges with the following
equivalence—a multiple edge with odd multiplicity is equivalent to having a single
edge between the two involved nodes and a multiple edge with even multiplicity is
equivalent to having no edge between the two nodes. Following this convention, we
will use the term graph to mean a multigraph with no loops.
4.1.1 LDPC Codes
Given a binary linear block code C, the parity-check matrix H of C is not necessarily
unique. This means that C has several Tanner graph representations. LDPC codes
are a special class of linear codes with the property that for a given family of codes,
there exists a Tanner graph family corresponding to these codes such that the number
of edges in the Tanner graph family increases linearly with block length. The term
low-density is applied to these codes because the number of edges in the Tanner graph
sequence grows slowly (linearly) with the block length n; in other words, the density
of ones in the parity-check matrix remains constant as n increases. We define an
LDPC code family by defining its Tanner graph family, or specifically, the number of
variable and check nodes in the Tanner graphs and their degrees.












with λi, ρj ∈ [0,1] ∩Q and ∑i λi = ∑j ρj = 1, a (λ, ρ) LDPC code of block length n is
defined as the binary linear block code which corresponds to a Tanner graph with n
variable nodes such that the fraction of edges connected to degree-i variable nodes is
λi, and the fraction of edges connected to degree-j check nodes is ρj. The polynomial
pair (λ, ρ) is called the degree distribution pair (DDP) of the LDPC code. ▼
Definition 4.3 (Regular and Irregular LDPC Codes). Given two positive integers
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l and r with r ≥ l, an (l,r)-regular LDPC code is one in which all variable nodes
have the same degree l and all check nodes have the same degree r, i.e., λ(x) = xl−1,
ρ(x) = xr−1. An LDPC code that is not regular is called an irregular LDPC code.
The Tanner corresponding to a regular (irregular) LDPC code is called a regular
(irregular) Tanner graph. ▼
While defining Tanner graphs in terms of the fraction with degree-i variable nodes
and the fraction with degree-j check nodes may appear straightforward, the above
indirect description of the degrees is employed because the polynomials λ(x) and ρ(x)
play an important role in the performance analysis of LDPC codes. The description
of the degrees using the polynomials (λ, ρ) is often called the edge-perspective degree
distribution. If we denote the edge set of the Tanner graph by E, then the number
of variable nodes with degree i is ni = ∣E∣λi/i and the number of check nodes with
degree j is mj = ∣E∣ρj/j. The number of variable nodes n and the number of check

















The fraction Li of variable nodes with degree i and the fraction Rj of check nodes




























Note that the definition of L(x) is not quite analogous to the definition of λ(x)
because in the former we multiply Li by xi, whereas in the latter we multiply λi by
xi−1. The definitions of R(x) and ρ(x) differ in the same point.
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Clearly, an LDPC code with block length n and node-perspective degree distri-
bution pair (L,R) must be such that nLi is an integer for all i. Therefore, the code
is defined only when n is an integral multiple of some integer a such that aLi ∈ N for
all i.
The design rate R∗ of the LDPC code is defined as










Clearly, λ(x) and ρ(x) should be such that R∗ ∈ [0,1] for this discussion to be mean-
ingful. The actual rate R of the code can be higher than R∗, and we have R = R∗ if
and only if the m parity-check equations represented in the Tanner graph are linearly
independent.
4.1.2 The Standard Ensemble of LDPC Codes
When classical error-correcting codes are studied in coding theory, a single code is
considered and its performance over a noisy channel is studied. In contrast to this, a
single instance of an LDPC code is not studied; instead, an ensemble of LDPC codes
with a given degree distribution and block length is considered, and the average
performance of the codes in this ensemble is studied. This is done because studying
the properties of a single LDPC code is very hard. Moreover, certain LDPC code
ensembles are such that most of the codes in it closely follow the average performance.
In such a case, we say that there is concentration around the average performance.
While studying LDPC codes, we usually consider the standard ensemble, which is
defined subsequently.
Given a degree distribution pair (DDP) (λ, ρ) and block length n, let m be the
number of check nodes in a (λ, ρ) Tanner graph with n variable nodes. A fraction
Li of the n variable nodes have degree i and a fraction Rj of the m check nodes
will have degree j. To construct the standard ensemble of Tanner graphs, denoted by
G(n,λ, ρ), we create n variable nodes and m check nodes such that nLi of the variable
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nodes have i “sockets” each and mRj of the check nodes have j sockets each (for all
possible i and j). We label the variable node sockets as 1,2, . . . , ∣E∣ and the check node
sockets as 1,2, . . . , ∣E∣. This labeling is done in some arbitrary manner, but remains
fixed throughout the construction of G(n,λ, ρ). Consider a permutation function
π ∶ {1,2, . . . , ∣E∣} → {1,2, . . . , ∣E∣}. The Tanner graph in G(n,λ, ρ) corresponding to
the permutation π is constructed by connecting the ith variable-node socket to the
π(i)th check-node socket with an edge, for i ∈ {1,2, . . . , ∣E∣}. The ensemble G(n,λ, ρ)
is constructed by considering all possible permutation functions π. Therefore, this
ensemble will have ∣E∣! Tanner graphs. For example, Fig. 14 depicts the construction
of the ensemble G(5, 12x +
1
2x
2, x3), where the permutation function π is varied over
all 12! different possibilities.
Note that G(n,λ, ρ) will contain Tanner graphs with parallel (multiple) edges.
In practice, we will never use such LDPC codes. However, we allow the possibility
of multiple edges because the ensemble becomes much easier to study. Typically,
we will study the probability that a randomly chosen graph from G(n,λ, ρ) has a
particular local structure. Given a subset of socket connection pairs (local structure),
the number of graphs that have this structure is precisely equal to the number of ways
we can connect the remaining sockets. The combinatorial analysis of the number of
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ways to connect the remaining sockets is much easier if we allow the possibility of
multiple edges.
4.1.3 Belief Propagation Decoding of LDPC Codes Over the BEC
One of the main advantages of LDPC codes is that they can be decoded efficiently
using a class of iterative algorithms called message-passing algorithms. A message-
passing algorithm can be visualized in terms of a sparse network connecting simple
distributed computing hardware [40, Ch. 16]. Messages are passed between vertices
in the Tanner graph along the edges with the property that the outgoing message sent
by a vertex along a particular edge depends on the incoming message on all other
edges adjacent to that vertex and the channel observation (if any). The BP algorithm
is one such message-passing algorithm where the messages are probabilities or beliefs
of what codeword was sent on the channel.
Consider an LDPC code C with the Tanner graph representation G transmitted
over a BEC. That is, a randomly selected codeword from C is transmitted and the re-
ceived word is a vector in {0,1, ?}, where ? represents an erased bit. The BP decoding
algorithm for recovering the erased bits is equivalent to the following algorithm.
 The messages sent along the edges are from the alphabet {0,1, ?}.
 Variable node processing: An erasure message ‘?’ is sent along an edge if the
channel observation for the variable node is an erasure and all other incoming
messages are also erasures. Otherwise, the channel observation or an incoming
non-erasure message from any of the other edges is sent. In the latter case,
all incoming non-erasure messages at a variable node will be identical; if the
channel observation is not an erasure, they will be identical to the channel
observation.
 Check node processing: An erasure message is sent along an edge if any of
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the other incoming messages are erasures. Otherwise, the sum (over F2) of all
other incoming messages is sent.
For general channels, we must specify a schedule for the BP algorithm, i.e., we
need to specify the sequence in which the node processing is done for all the nodes
in the Tanner graph. In the case of the BP algorithm for the BEC, any reasonable
schedule will yield the same performance. For the sake of clarity, we assume that we
use the flooding schedule.
The flooding schedule is the most commonly used schedule for BP decoding and
it operates as follows. In the zeroth iteration, the variable nodes send their received
value along all their edges simultaneously. All further iterations consist of two steps.
In the first step, all check nodes are processed simultaneously. In the second step,
all variable nodes are processed simultaneously. The flooding schedule is so called
because the messages are released on to all the edges at the same time (i.e., “flooded”).
In practical applications, only a finite number of iterations of the BP algorithm are
performed. The BP algorithm for erasures is a special case where the number of
“errors” (strictly speaking, undecoded bits) decreases monotonically as the number
of iterations increases; the BP decoder will reach a certain stage where no more
decoding is possible. In this chapter, we will only consider the operation of the BP
decoder until this saturation point.
The erasure BP decoding algorithm with the flooding schedule is equivalent to
the following iterative graphical evolution algorithm.
1. Let G∗ be the subgraph of the Tanner graph G induced by the variable nodes
associated with the unknown codeword bits, and their neighboring check nodes.
If G∗ is an empty graph, then declare decoding success and exit.
2. Find all variable nodes in G∗ that are connected to degree-one check nodes (in
G∗). If there are no such nodes, then declare decoding failure and exit.
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Figure 15: An example of the graphical evolution under BP decoding. The edges
and vertices in black denote the subgraph G∗ induced by the unsolved variable nodes
and their neighbors.
3. Solve the codeword bits associated with the variable nodes found in the previous
step.
4. Go to Step 1.
From the above description of BP decoding, we can see that whenever BP decoding
failure occurs, the unknown codeword bits at the last stage induce a subgraph G∗
such that all the check nodes in G∗ have degree two or more.
4.1.4 Stopping Sets
Definition 4.4 (Stopping Set). Let G be a Tanner graph with variable-node set Vv
and check-node set Vc. We call a set S ∈ Vv a stopping set if the subgraph G∗ induced
by S and its neighbors (in Vc) has no degree-one check nodes. ▼
For example, in Fig. 15, the set {v1, v2} is a stopping set. For a given LDPC code
C, we denote the collection of all stopping sets in its Tanner graph G by S(C). The BP
decoder for LDPC codes with erasures fails if and only if the erasure pattern contains
a stopping set. If we denote the probability of block error of the code C transmitted
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over BEC(ε) under BP decoding by PBPB (C, ε), we have
PBPB (C, ε) = Pr (∃S ⊆ Ve ∶ S ∈ S(C))
where the random variable Ve denotes the set of all variable nodes inG that correspond
to the bits erased during channel transmission. Note that in the above, we define the
block-error probability for a fixed code C. In this dissertation, we usually deal with
the case where C itself is random. If the graph G is chosen uniformly at random from
the standard ensemble G(n,λ, ρ), then the average probability of block error can be
calculated as
E (PBPB (C, ε)) = E (Pr (∃S ⊆ Ve ∶ S ∈ S(C)))
where the expectation E is taken over all G ∈ G(n,λ, ρ). From the above equation, we
see that by characterizing the asymptotic distribution of stopping sets, we can com-
pletely characterize the average probability of block error of the standard ensemble
of LDPC codes. We will now discuss some of the definitions and results from [39].
For an arbitrary integer s ∈ {0,1, . . . , n}, the average stopping set distribution of
the standard ensemble is defined as
E(s) = E (∣{S ∈ S(C) ∶ ∣S∣ = s}∣)
In other words, E(s) is the average number of stopping sets of size s in the standard
ensemble.
For any rational α ∈ [0,1], it is assumed that there exists a sequence (nk)k∈N of
increasing block lengths such that E(αnk) > 0 for all nk. Under this assumption, the






It can be shown that γ(α) is continuous over the set of rationals in [0,1] and hence,
it can be extended to a continuous function over [0,1].
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One of the main results in [39] is that below a certain “error-floor threshold”,
the average block-error probability of the standard ensemble of LDPC codes decays
polynomially over the BEC.
Theorem 4.5 ( [39, Thm. 16]). For a code C chosen uniformly at random from the
ensemble G (n,λ, ρ) with lmin ≥ 2, if ε < εef , then







as ε→ 0 and n→∞.
The parameter εef for a given DDP (λ, ρ) is defined [39, §V] as
εef ≜ sup{ε ∶ max
α∈[0,ε]
(γ(α) + (1 − α)h(
ε − α
1 − α
) − h(ε)) ≤ 0}
where h(x) ≜ −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function.
4.2 An Overview of Results and Intuition
The research presented in this chapter uses the results of Orlitsky, et al. [39] as a
starting point. One of the key ideas in [39] is the use of the union bound to upper
bound the average block-error probability of an ensemble of LDPC codes. Given a
countable set of events {A1,A2,A3, . . .}, the union bound says that the probability of
at least one of the events happening is less than the sum of the individual probabilities.
That is,
Pr (A1 ∪A2 ∪A3 ∪⋯) ≤∑
i
Pr (Ai)
The average block-error probability of an ensemble of LDPC codes is given by the
probability that the erasure pattern Ve contains a stopping set S ∈ S(C).
PBPB (C, ε) = Pr (∃S ⊆ Ve ∶ S ∈ S(C))
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The event that Ve contains a stopping set is the union of the events Ai defined as
Ai ≜ Ve contains a size-i stopping set
⇒ Pr(Ai) = Pr{∃S ⊆ Ve ∶ S ∈ S(C), ∣S∣ = i}
= ∣{S ∈ S(C) ∶ ∣S∣ = i}∣ εi
Therefore, it can be seen that











Orlitsky, et al. [39] showed that whenever ε < εef , the above summation decays to
zero as n increases. Moreover, the asymptotically significant term in (5) is the one








4.2.1 Expurging Graphs with Short Cycles
In (5), the summation is over the contribution of stopping sets of size one or more.
The intuition behind our work is based on the following observation (§4.4.1). If we
sum the terms εi E(i) for stopping sets of size k or greater, where k is a positive
integer, then the asymptotically significant contribution is the one corresponding to








This means that ∑
n
i=k ε
i E(i) decays at the above rate, which is faster than that of the
summation in (5). This gives rise to the intuition that by removing stopping sets of
size less than k, we will have a faster decay of the block-error rate. In other words,
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we must expurgate Tanner graphs with stopping sets of size less than k from the
standard ensemble G(n,λ, ρ).
Instead of expurgating graphs with small stopping sets, we consider the expur-
gation of graphs with short cycles from the standard ensemble. We do this because
the girth of graphs is a well studied property with a lot of mathematical results.
Moreover, there is a fundamental relationship between girth and stopping sets.
Lemma 4.6. For lmin ≥ 2, any graph G ∈ G(n,λ, ρ) with girth 2k or more will not
have any stopping sets of size less than k.
Proof. We will prove this by contradiction. Assume that the graph G has a stopping
set of size s < k. Consider the subgraph G∗ induced by this stopping set and its check-
node neighbors. All the check nodes in G∗ have degree two or more. Since lmin ≥ 2,
all the variable nodes in G∗ also have degree two or more. This means that G∗ is
not a tree and should therefore contain a cycle. Since there are only s variable nodes
in G∗ and G∗ is bipartite, the length of the cycle cannot be more than 2s, which, in
turn, is less than 2k. Since G∗ is a subgraph of G, this is a contradiction.
So far, we have established that removing graphs with short cycles from G(n,λ, ρ)
will give us an expurgated ensemble that does not have any small stopping sets. We
now consider the probability of block-error for the expurgated ensemble. Suppose
a code C1 is chosen at random from the expurgated ensemble and transmitted over
BEC(ε). The expected BP block error probability is given by
E (PBPB (C1, ε)) =∑
i












where E1(i) ≜ E (∣{S ∈ S(C1) ∶ ∣S∣ = i}∣). The final equality in (6) is because the expur-











This does not necessarily mean that the expression in (6) decays at the same rate.
This is because we have not shown that E1(i) and E(i) are equal. In fact, explicit
computation of E1(i) is difficult because the combinatorial analysis of the expurgated
ensemble is hard. We get around this by showing that we can bound E1(i) using E(i).
4.2.2 Bounding Expectations over the Expurgated Ensemble
We have two codes C and C1 selected at random. The code C is uniformly sampled from
G(n,λ, ρ), the standard ensemble, and C1 is uniformly sampled from G2k−2(n,λ, ρ), the
ensemble consisting of Tanner graphs of girth at least 2k. Let f be some function
that maps a code to a non-negative real number. We have
E(f(C1)) = E(f(C) ∣ C ∈ G2k−2(n,λ, ρ))
Also, we observe that
E(f(C)) = E(f(C) ∣ C ∈ G2k−2(n,λ, ρ)) Pr(C ∈ G2k−2(n,λ, ρ))
+E(f(C) ∣ C ∉ G2k−2(n,λ, ρ)) Pr(C ∉ G2k−2(n,λ, ρ))
a




Here, (a) follows from the fact that f(C) is always non-negative. We then show
(Lemma 4.9) that for a given k, λ and ρ, we have
∣G2k−2(n,λ, ρ)∣
∣G(n,λ, ρ)∣
≥ p > 0
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for large enough n and some positive number p. Therefore,
E (f(C)) ≥ pE (f(C1))




We require p > 0 in order to write the last step in the above. By substituting f(C) =





4.3 The Asymptotic Fraction of Short-Cycle-Free LDPC
Codes
When we study LDPC codes, we usually consider the standard ensemble of Tanner
graphs. As discussed in §4.1.2, this ensemble contains Tanner graphs that have par-
allel edges, i.e., cycles of length two. Given a DDP (λ, ρ) and an even number g > 0,
we show that the asymptotic fraction of Tanner graphs with girth greater than g in




for large enough n. Here, Gg(n,λ, ρ) denotes the subset of G(n,λ, ρ) that consists
of graphs with girth greater than g. Strictly speaking, we show that this result is
true for a given (λ, ρ) and g > 0 for a particular sequence of increasing block lengths.
We conjecture that the result holds without any restrictions on the sequence of block
lengths. However, the conjecture is not required for the results in this chapter.
4.3.1 Short-Cycle-Free Regular Bipartite Graphs
The result in this section hinges on the following result from the graph theory commu-
nity, which states that for any even number g > 0, the asymptotic fraction of d-regular
bipartite graphs with girth greater than g is positive.
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Lemma 4.7 (McKay, et al. [41, Cor. 3]). Let n, g be even positive integers and d ≥ 3
be an integer. As n grows, let (d − 1)2g−1 = o(n). Then, the fraction of (labeled)














While the above lemma is true when d and g vary with n, we will consider only
the special case where d and g are constant with n.
In the Lemma 4.7, McKay, et al. [41] consider the ensemble of vertex-labeled d-
regular bipartite graphs in n vertices. Let us denote this ensemble by G∗(n, d). To
build a graph in G∗(n, d), we first take n vertices, half of them on the left side and
half of them on the right side, and assign them some arbitrary (but fixed) labels. In
the second step, we add edges such that each vertex has exactly d edges, with each
edge connecting a left vertex to a right vertex while allowing the possibility of parallel
edges. By varying the second step, we generate all the graphs in G∗(n, d).
The ensemble G∗(n, d) is related to the standard ensemble of LDPC codes given
by G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1)—they both consist of d-regular bipartite graphs in n vertices.
In the ensemble G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1), we label the sockets of the vertices instead of the
vertices themselves. Given a socket labeling, we can create an ordering of the labels
such that all sockets of a node form a contiguous cluster in the ordering. In this
sense, the socket labeling in G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1) naturally induces a vertex labeling
(ordering). Let f ∶ G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1)→ G∗(n, d) be a function that takes a graph from
the standard ensemble, and assigns the natural labels for the vertices and removes the
socket labels to create a graph in the vertex-labeled ensemble. For example, Fig. 16
illustrates a socket-labeled graph G and its vertex-labeled counterpart f(G).
Clearly, the map f is a surjection, i.e., f (G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1)) = G∗(n, d). We ob-





























Figure 16: A socket-labeled graph G and its vertex labeled counterpart f(G).
graph in any way; in particular,
girth(G) = girth(f (G) )
Therefore, we have
f (Gg(n/2, x
d−1, xd−1)) = G∗g (n, d)
Here, G∗g (n, d) denotes the subset of G
∗(n, d) that consists of graphs with girth greater
than g.
Consider the inverse image of any graph G in G∗(n, d). As long as G has no
parallel edges, it has exactly (d!)
n
elements, i.e., ∣f−1(G)∣ = (d!)
n
. This is because
any given vertex has d sockets, which can be labeled in d! different ways. There are
n vertices, so the number of graphs in G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1) that map to G is exactly
(d!)
n
. However, the case where G has multiple edges is a little more complicated. It
can be easily seen that (d!)
n
is an overcount of the number of graphs in f−1(G). If




In any case, we have ∣f−1(G)∣ ≤ (d!)
n





≤ ∣G(n/2, xd−1, xd−1)∣ (8)




Note that in (9), we have an equality because the restriction ‘girth > g’ gets rid of



















where (a) follows from Lemma 4.7.
Corollary 4.8. Let g, n be positive even numbers and let d ≥ 3 be an integer. Let
d and g remain constant as n → ∞. Then, the fraction of graphs in the ensemble













as n→∞. In particular, the fraction is bounded away from zero for large n.
4.3.2 Short-Cycle-Free Irregular Tanner Graphs
In Corollary 4.8, we showed that short-cycle-free (d, d)-regular Tanner graphs form
an asymptotically significant fraction of the graphs in the corresponding standard
ensemble. In this section, we show a similar result for (λ, ρ) irregular Tanner graph
ensembles—for a certain sequence (nk)k∈N of block lengths, we show that the asymp-
totic fraction of the graphs in G(nk, λ, ρ) with girth greater than g is positive.
Lemma 4.9. Let (λ, ρ) be a DDP and let g > 0 be an integer that remains constant.
There exists an increasing sequence (nk) of positive integers such that the fraction of
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> 0 as k →∞
Proof. Let d be the least common multiple of all the vertex degrees in the graph, i.e.,
d = LCM ({i ∶ λi > 0} ∪ {j ∶ ρj > 0})
If the above calculation gives d = 2, set d = 4. Clearly, d > 2 and it is a function of






∈ N, ∀i, j
Here, Li is the fraction of variable nodes with degree i and Rj is the fraction of
check nodes with degree j. Consider the sequence of block lengths (nk)k∈N given by
nk = ak. By choosing a in a specific manner, we have made sure that the number
of degree-i variable nodes and the number of degree-j check nodes in G(nk, λ, ρ) are
both divisible by d for all i and j.
We now define a node-grouping map, which maps the graphs in G(nk, λ, ρ) to
(d, d)-regular Tanner graphs. Given a graph G from the former ensemble, we group
d/i of the degree i variable nodes to get one variable node of degree d. If we do this
for all the variable node degrees, we will have a left-regular Tanner graph with left
degree d. Similarly, we can repeat this process for the check nodes to get a d-regular
Tanner graph on n∗k variable nodes and n
∗














Fig. 17 shows an example of the node grouping map from G(4, x, x3) to G(2, x3, x3).
In this node grouping process, we preserve the number of edges (sockets) by allowing
the possibility of multiple edges. We also preserve the socket labels while grouping
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Figure 17: An example of the node grouping process. For simplicity, the socket
labels are omitted.
the nodes. This directly means that the number of graphs in the ensembles G(nk, λ, ρ)
and G(n∗k, x
d−1, xd−1) are equal, i.e.,




Let us denote the node grouping map by φ ∶ G(nk, λ, ρ) → G(n∗k, x
d−1, xd−1). By
the socket preserving property of φ, we can immediately see that φ is a bijection. It
is also clear that by combining nodes, we cannot increase the lengths of the existing
cycles. Therefore, for any graph G ∈ G(nk, λ, ρ), we have girth(G) ≥ girth(φ(G)).








d−1, xd−1)∣ ≤ ∣Gg(nk, λ, ρ)∣ (11)








By Corollary 4.8, the right-hand-side term in the above inequality is positive for large




for large enough k.
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4.4 Asymptotic Block-Error Probability
Theorem 4.10. Let (λ, ρ) be a DDP with minimum variable node degree lmin, maxi-
mum variable node degree lmax and maximum check node degree rmax > 2. If the code
C1 is chosen uniformly at random from G2k−2(n,λ, ρ) and if ε < εef , we have







and in the limits of small ε and large n,







4.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.10
Let Ve be the set of variable nodes corresponding to the random erasures that occur
during transmission. The BP decoder fails iff Ve contains a stopping set. So,
PBPB (C1, ε) = Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve)
For any δ1, δ2 > 0, we bound PBPB (C1, ε) using union bound as
PBPB (C1, ε) ≤ Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, k ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ δ1n)
+Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, δ1n ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ (ε + δ2)n)
+Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, (ε + δ2)n ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ n)
The constants δ1, δ2 can be arbitrarily chosen by us and we will carefully set their
values in the remainder of the proof. In the above, we only count stopping sets of size
k or more because by restricting girth to 2k or more, we have eliminated stopping sets
of size less than k. The probability PBPB (C1, ε) is a function of the random variable
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C1. The expected value of the function is
E (PBPB (C1, ε)) ≤ E(Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, k ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ δ1n))
+E(Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, δ1n ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ (ε + δ2)n))
+E(Pr(∃S ∈ S(C1) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, (ε + δ2)n ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ n))
⇒ E (PBPB (C1, ε)) ≤
1
p








E(Pr(∃S ∈ S(C) ∶ S ⊂ Ve, (ε + δ2)n ≤ ∣S∣ ≤ n)) (12)





for large enough n (Lemma 4.9).
The proof of the theorem follows from the following three claims.
Claim 4.11. As n→∞ and ε→ 0, the first term in (12) decays as







Claim 4.12. As n increases, the second and the third terms in (12) decay exponen-
tially in n.
Claim 4.12 was proved by Orlitsky, et al. [39, Proof of Thm. 16] in a related
context. The condition ε < εef is required in their proof of this claim. The proof of
Claim 4.11, provided below, is our novel contribution.
Proof of Claim 4.11. The probability that the erasure pattern Ve contains a stopping
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set of size between k and δ1n can be upper bounded by the union bound as follows















Now, we analyze E(i), the average number of stopping sets of size i in the standard
ensemble. A stopping set of i variable nodes can have nodes of different degrees.
Let us denote the number of degree-s variable nodes in the variable-node subset
by is. Let Si denote the set of all non-negative integer solutions to the equation
ilmin + ilmin+1 + ⋯ + ilmax = i. In other words, Si is the number of ways we can select
the degrees of the i variable nodes. The number of ways we can form a variable-node











We can choose δ1 to be sufficiently small so that i, which is always smaller than δ1n,
cannot exceed nLis for any s. The probability that this variable node subset S is a
stopping set is given by
EPr(S ∈ S(C)) = no. of ways to connect S to form a stopping set
no. of ways to connect S
If we denote the number of ways to connect S to form a stopping set by A, we have


















we can say that



























The quantity A is the number of ways of choosing ∑ sis check-node sockets such that
we select at least two sockets from each participating check node. As long as i is a
small fraction of n, which we can ensure by selecting a small enough δ1, we can keep
A independent of n (for a given i). Also note that if we increase the degree of all the
check nodes, A can only increase. Therefore, we can upper bound A by the number of
ways to select check-node sockets assuming that all check nodes have the maximum
degree rmax.
For a non-negative integer rj ≤ rmax, the number of ways of choosing rj sockets
from a check node of degree rmax is (
rmax
rj
). To form a stopping set, we must choose rj
sockets from the jth check node in the Tanner graph such that rj ∈ {0,2,3,4, . . . ,rmax}
and ∑
m
j=1 rj = ∑ sis. The total number of ways to select the sockets (assuming maxi-










) = coef(((1 + x)rmax − rmaxx)
m
, x∑ sis)
Here, coef(p(x), xr) denotes the coefficient of xr in the polynomial p(x). Note that
we are subtracting the term rmaxx because rj ≠ 1 for any j. We can now upper bound
the quantity A as follows.











where the last inequality follows from [39, Lemma 18]. If we denote ∑ sis by w, we
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have ilmin ≤ w ≤ ilmax. Substituting the above in (14), we get





























































⌊w2 ⌋! (∣E∣ − ilmax)
w (15)











































Since rmax > 2 we have ∣E∣ > 2m. Again, if we choose δ1 small enough, we will have
f(2r + 2)/f(2r + 1) ≤ 1. So, f(w) is a non-increasing function and w ≥ ilmin, we can
upper bound all the summands in (15) by f(ilmin). We now have
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In step (a), we have used the fact that ∣Si∣ ≤ (i + 1)lmax . Also, α ≜m/n and β ≜ ∣E∣/n
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Choosing δ3 ∈ (0,1) such that β − δ3lmax > 0 and letting δ1 < δ3,
Ji+2
Ji
≤ (2rmax − 3)
2lmax 2rmax
(α + δ3lmax2 )
lmin(3lmin)2lmin
















where B depends only on λ and ρ. Going back to (13), and substituting (16) and
(17), we get




















If δ1 is small enough, then the summation in the final expression is bounded by a















and among these two terms, Jk has a slower decay. Therefore,







as ε→ 0 and n→∞.
4.5 Secrecy Regions
Recall that for strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ), we require a sequence of codes whose
block-error probability over BEC(1−ξ) decays as 1/n2. From Theorem 4.10, we know
that the block-error probability of LDPC codes without cycles of length 2k − 2 or








over BEC(ε) for ε < εef . In particular, the duals of (λ, ρ) LDPC codes with lmin ≥ 3
and without cycles of length four or less will achieve O(1/n2) block-error on an
average. Loosely speaking, a randomly selected code from this ensemble can be
“expected” to achieve strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for all ξ > 1 − εef . In a stricter
sense, this is an existence result—there exists an LDPC code in the aforementioned
ensemble that achieves strong secrecy for all ξ > 1 − εef .
4.5.1 The Value of εef
Given the value of the function γ(α) for α ∈ [0,1], the computation of εef is straight-
forward. The computation of γ(α) depends on whether the the DDP corresponds to
a regular or an irregular LDPC code.





(1 + x0)r − rx0
xαr0
) − (l − 1)h(α)
where x0 is the only positive solution of
x ((1 + x)r−1 − 1)
(1 + x)r − rx
= α
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For an irregular DDP, the computation of εef is much more involved and we refer
the reader to [39, Lemma 4, Thm. 5].
Since the computation of εef is completely indirect, there is no known direct ana-
lytic technique to track its value. For our strong secrecy application, we are interested
in achieving large values of εef . The following upper bound is obvious
εef ≤ εth < 1 −R (18)
The closer bound follows from two facts.
1. For ε < εef , the probability of block-error for a randomly selected LDPC code
from the standard ensemble over BEC(ε) goes to zero [39, Thm. 16].
2. For ε > εth, the BER of a randomly selected LDPC code from the standard
ensemble over BEC(ε) is bounded away from zero.
We performed numerical computation of εef for a collection of DDPs and found that
εef is bounded away from εth. Fig. 18 shows a plot of the values for rate-
1
2 DDPs
optimized for high εth using the LDPCOPT online database [42]. In this case, we
also note that the maximum value of εef is achieved by the (3,6) regular LDPC code.
4.5.2 Strong and Weak Secrecy Regions
In this chapter, we consider a DDP of rate R and lmin ≥ 3, analyze the strong secrecy
region—the values of ξ for which there exist LDPC codes with girth at least six
achieve strong secrecy—for the BEWC(ξ). We have shown that
1 − εef < ξ ≤ 1
Thangaraj, et al. [1, §IV-B] considered achieving weak secrecy using the duals of
LDPC codes over the BEWC and showed that the weak secrecy region is given by
1 − εth < ξ ≤ 1
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Figure 18: The values of εef and εth for threshold-optimized rate-
1
2 LDPC codes.






Figure 19: A sketch of the weak and strong secrecy regions achieved by short-cycle-
free LDPC codes.
61






Figure 20: Weak and strong secrecy regions achieved by the DDPs (0.9131x2 +
0.0124x17+0.0651x18+0.009363x70,0.2703x8+0.7297x9) (Code A) and (x2, x5) (Code
B).
Combining the above two secrecy regions and using the bound (18), we sketch the
secrecy region of short-cycle-free LDPC codes in Fig. 19.
For example, Fig. 20 shows the secrecy regions of two rate-12 LDPC codes. Code
A is a threshold-optimized LDPC code and Code B is the (3,6) regular LDPC code.
Code A has εth ≈ 0.460 and εef ≈ 0.184 and the duals will achieve weak secrecy for
ξ ∈ (0.540,0.816] and strong secrecy for ξ ∈ (0.816,1]. The (3,6) regular code has
εth ≈ 0.429 and εef ≈ 0.365. Therefore, the dual codes will achieve weak secrecy for
ξ ∈ (0.571,0.635] and strong secrecy for ξ ∈ (0.635,1].
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CHAPTER V
LARGE-GIRTH LDPC CODES FOR STRONG SECRECY
In Chapter 3, we showed that we can achieve strong secrecy on the BEWC model
using the duals of codes whose block-error probability decays as 1/n2 as the block
length n increases. A solution to this problem was discussed in Chapter 4, where we
considered short-cycle-free LDPC codes, i.e., LDPC codes whose Tanner graphs did
not have any cycles of length less than six. Using a stopping-set analysis, we studied
the asymptotic block-error probability of these codes under BP decoding and showed
that they indeed satisfy the requirement for strong secrecy.
In this chapter, we consider “large-girth” LDPC codes, i.e., LDPC codes corre-
sponding to Tanner graphs whose girth grows logarithmically fast as the block length
increases. Instead of directly studying the block-error rate of these codes, we study
their bit-error rate using density-evolution analysis and use it to upper bound the
block-error rate. For certain large-girth LDPC codes, we show that the BER and the
block-error rate over BEC decay in a sub-exponential manner, i.e., as O (exp (−c1nc2))
for some constants c1 > 0 and 0 < c2 ≤ 1, when the erasure probability is below the
threshold. The results pertaining to this chapter were published in [43].
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of the density
evolution analysis of LDPC codes over the BEC. In the second section, we show that
the density evolution BER estimate decays in a double-exponential manner below
the BEC threshold as the number of iterations increases. In the third section, we
motivate the use of large-girth LDPC codes for strong secrecy and provide a short
survey of some prior work regarding LDPC codes with high girth. In the fourth
section, we provide a brief overview of Lubotzky-Phillips-Sarnak (LPS) graphs, their
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properties, and their applications in error-correction coding. In the fifth section, we
provide an algorithm to construct large-girth LDPC codes from LPS graphs. The
sub-exponential fall of the BER of these LDPC codes is proved in the sixth section.
In the final section, we discuss the strong secrecy region achieved by our large-girth
LDPC codes.
5.1 Background on Density Evolution
As discussed in our brief introduction to LDPC codes (§4.1) in the previous chap-
ter, the performance of individual LDPC codes is not usually studied; instead, the
analysis focuses on the average performance of an ensemble of LDPC codes. One of
the quantities of interest is the average BER of LDPC codes uniformly sampled from
the standard ensemble. One of the ways to study this quantity is to use an analysis
technique called density evolution. Density evolution provides a generalized frame-
work to analyze the bit-error rate of sparse-graph codes over symmetric channels.
The analysis in this chapter is limited to LDPC codes over the BEC. In the following
discussion, we will give a brief introduction to the density evolution analysis of the
bit-error rate of the BP decoder when it decodes an LDPC codeword transmitted over
a BEC. The material in this section is based on the discussion in the book Modern
Coding Theory [34, §3.7-3.11].
Let Hn be an arbitrary ensemble of Tanner graphs with n variable nodes. Suppose
a graph G is selected uniformly at random from Hn and a random codeword from the
associated code is transmitted over BEC(ε). The receiver, with the knowledge of G,
tries to decode the transmitted word using the BP decoding algorithm. For a family
of ensembles (Hn) with increasing block length n, let
 x(t, n) = the probability that a randomly selected edge in the Tanner graph G
transmits an erasure message from its variable node to its check node at the tth
iteration
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 y(t, n) = the probability that a randomly selected codeword bit is unknown after
t iterations. In other words, y(t, n) is the average bit-error probability of Hn
after t iterations of BP decoding.
5.1.1 Computation Graphs
To evaluate x(t, n) and y(t, n) explicitly, the computation graphs [34, §3.7] associated
with the Tanner graph ensemble Hn may be considered. Suppose a graph G is selected
from Hn uniformly at random and a random edge e is picked from G. Let v be the
variable node connected to e. The level-t edge-rooted computation graph C⃗t of Hn is
defined as the subgraph obtained by traversing from v up to iteration depth t in all
initial directions except along e. Since the selection of the graph G and the edge e
are both random, the computation graph C⃗t is a random graph whose distribution
depends only on t andHn. Also, x(t, n) can be uniquely determined given the possible
realizations of C⃗t and their probabilities.
To evaluate y(t, n), the level-t node-rooted computation graph C̊t, defined subse-
quently, may be considered. As before, a graph G is selected from Hn uniformly at
random. Then, a variable node v is picked from G uniformly at random. The graph
C̊t is defined as the subgraph obtained by traversing from v up to iteration depth t
in all directions. Like C⃗t, the distribution of C̊t is also dependent only on t and Hn.
The probability y(t, n) can be uniquely determined given the possible realizations of
C̊t and their probabilities.
Fig. 21(a) shows the level-2 edge-rooted computation graph corresponding to the
edge e in the Tanner graph in Fig. 21(b). Fig. 22(b) shows the level-2 node-rooted
computation graph corresponding to the variable node v1 in the same Tanner graph.
Note that in both the figures, we have duplicated some of the nodes and we have
drawn the graphs like a tree. This is done for the sake of simplicity in visualization.






Figure 21: A Tanner graph (a) and the level-2 computation graph (b) rooted at the





Figure 22: A Tanner graph (a) and the level-2 computation graph (b) rooted at the
node v1.
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duplicate edges in the two figures, and they will contain some cycles.
It can be noted that even though the computation graphs in Figs. 21 and 22 are
expanded from the same variable node, they are different. In general, the computation
graphs C⃗t and C̊t are slightly different in the following two aspects.
 The root node degrees are different in the two graphs. Loosely speaking, the
root node degree in C̊t is one more than that of C⃗t. This is because, while
constructing C⃗t, we don’t travel along the root edge.
 Even ignoring the difference in the degrees, the degree distribution of the “root”
variable node is different for C⃗t and C̊t. This is because, the degree of a vari-
able node attached to a randomly chosen edge is dictated by λ(x), the edge-
perspective degree distribution, while that of a randomly chosen variable node
is dictated by L(x), the node-perspective degree distribution.
5.1.2 Tree Ensembles
While studying the error-correcting performance of LDPC codes, the codes corre-
sponding to the standard ensemble of Tanner graphs G(n,λ, ρ) are usually considered.
The graphs in this ensemble contain n variable nodes, whose degrees are determined
by the degree distribution polynomial λ(x) = ∑i λix
i−1, where λi is the fraction of
edges that are connected to degree-i variable nodes. The check-node degree distri-
bution is determined by the polynomial ρ(x) = ∑j ρjx
j−1, where ρj is the fraction of
edges connected to degree-j check nodes.
In the classical setting, Hn = G(n,λ, ρ) is considered, and x(t, n) and y(t, n)
are analyzed while keeping t fixed and letting n grow monotonically. The possible
computation graphs of G(n,λ, ρ) are not cycle-free and hence enumerating them is
cumbersome. Doing an exact analysis of the average bit-error probability y(t, n) for
this ensemble is therefore difficult. By enumerating the computation graphs, one can
note that for a fixed iteration depth t and increasing n the computation graphs C⃗t
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and C̊t will be trees with probability converging to unity at a rate that is O(1/n). In
other words,




The term density evolution refers to the calculation of the bit-error probability by
assuming that the computation graphs are identical to the limiting trees. The density
evolution analysis is so called because it analyzes the evolution of probability density
of the messages sent along the edges as the number of decoding iterations increases.
The level-t node-rooted tree ensemble T̊t corresponding to the DDP (λ, ρ) is a
random tree that has a Tanner-graph-like bipartite structure. The tree T̊t is built
iteratively starting from a root variable node according to the following steps.
1. The root variable node of the tree has i sockets with probability Li, where Li
is the fraction of degree-i variable nodes allowed by the DDP (λ, ρ).
2. For levels 1 to t, do the following
(a) For each free variable-node socket in the previous level, add a check node.
Each such check node has j sockets with probability ρj and one of these
sockets connects to the corresponding variable-node socket in the previous
level. The number of sockets in a check node is independent from all other
events.
(b) For each free check-node socket from the previous step, add a variable node.
A variable-node added at this way will have i sockets with probability λi
and one of these sockets connects to the corresponding check-node socket.
The number of sockets in the variable nodes are chosen independently.
In the above process, the leaf variable nodes, which are the level-t variable nodes,
will have only one fulfilled socket. The unfulfilled sockets are discarded from the
construction.
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Figure 23: An instance T of the node-rooted tree ensemble and the probabilities
associated with the node degrees.
The level-t edge-rooted tree ensemble T⃗t is constructed with a nearly identical
algorithm except for the fact that the root variable node has degree i with probability
λi+1. It can be shown that T⃗t is an asymptotic approximation of C⃗t, and T̊t is an
asymptotic approximation of C̊t.
For a given tree T , the probability of the tree ensemble T̊t being equal to T can
be calculated as follows. Suppose the tree T has qj check nodes of degree j and
pi non-leaf variable nodes of degree i, with the root variable node having degree i0.
Then,













The probability of the edge-rooted tree ensemble T⃗t being equal to T is given by













For example, given the DDP (λ, ρ), the probability of the node-rooted tree ensemble
T̊2 is equal to the tree T in Fig. 23 is given by the product of all the node-degree
probabilities in the figure. That is,










5.1.3 The Density Evolution Equations
The tree ensemble T⃗t is a Tanner graph, and hence it has a binary linear code associ-
ated with it. Suppose a random codeword from this code is transmitted over BEC(ε)
and decoded using t iterations of the BP decoding algorithm. Let xt denote the bit-
error probability of the root variable node after BP decoding. A similar probability
yt for the tree ensemble T̊t can be defined. It can be easily seen that xt and yt are
given by the following recursive relationship.
x0 = ε
xt = ελ(1 − ρ(1 − xt−1)), t > 0
yt = εL(1 − ρ(1 − xt−1)), t > 0
The above equations are the density evolution equations for the BEC.
Definition 5.1 (Threshold). The erasure threshold εth of an LDPC DDP (λ, ρ) is
defined as the supremum of the erasure parameter ε for which the density evolution
estimate for BEC xt, or equivalently yt, converges to zero. That is,




In other words, the threshold is loosely defined as the “worst” channel parameter
for which the density evolution BER estimate converges to zero.
5.1.4 Density Evolution Estimate vs. Bit-Error Probability
The quantity yt given by density evolution is an estimate of the average bit-error
probability when a random code Cn from the standard ensemble G(n,λ, ρ) of LDPC
codes is transmitted over BEC(ε). For a given code Cn, let PBPb (Cn, ε, t) denote the
probability of bit error after t iterations of BP decoding. It can be shown that the
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average bit-error probability E (PBPb (Cn, ε, t)) ≜ y(t, n) approaches yt as long as t
remains constant and n increases. In particular, it can be shown that for a constant
integer t
∣E (PBPb (Cn, ε, t)) − yt∣ = O (
1
n
) , as n→∞
5.2 Asymptotic Behavior of Density Evolution Estimate
It is a well-known result that the quantities xt and yt exhibit a double-exponential
decay as t goes to infinity for ε < εth. A proof of this result for regular codes was
provided by Lentmaier, et al. [44, §V-A]. For the sake of completeness, we state
the more general result for irregular codes and provide an alternative proof involving
mathematical induction.
Lemma 5.2. For a DDP (λ, ρ) with minimum variable node degree lmin ≥ 3 and
ε < εth, we have
xt, yt = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t)) (19)
as t→∞, where β > 0 is a constant.
Proof. For any x ∈ [0,1], we have
(1 − x)d−1 ≥ 1 − (d − 1)x, ∀d ∈ N










(1 − (d − 1)x)ρd
= 1 − (ravg − 1)x
⇒ 1 − ρ(1 − x) ≤ (ravg − 1)x
where ravg = ∑j jρj is the average check-node degree from the edge-perspective. For
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0 ≤ (ravg − 1)x ≤ 1,
f(ε, x) = ελ(1 − ρ(1 − x))
a














⇒ f(ε, x) ≤ ε((ravg − 1)x)
lmin−1 =∶ g(ε, x) (20)
Note that (a) follows from the monotonicity of λ(x), and (b) follows from the given
condition 0 ≤ (ravg − 1)x ≤ 1. To make the notation easier, let us denote A = ε(ravg −
1)lmin−1. Since we are operating in the region ε < εth where xt converges to zero, there
exists an R such that Axlmin−2R ≤ 1 and (ravg − 1)xR ≤ 1. The first inequality will be
used later in the proof.
Let us construct a sequence zR+i+1 = g(ε, zR+i) with zR = xR. It is immaterial what
zi takes when i < R. We then claim that xR+i ≤ zR+i for any non-negative integer i.
We can prove this claim by induction. The base case is when i = 0 and it is true by
our choice of zR. Assuming the claim is true for some integer i ≥ 0, we have
xR+i+1 = f(ε, xR+i) ≤ g(ε, xR+i) ≤ g(ε, zR+i) = zR+i+1
The first inequality is due to (20) and the second inequality is due to the monotonicity































lmin−2 exp (−αR(lmin − 1)
i)
Due to our choice of R, αR ≜
−1























xt = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t)) as t→∞



























⇒ yt = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t))
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It is important to note that a similar double exponential decay result is not true
for DDPs that have degree-two variable nodes, i.e., with lmin = 2. Working out the
expressions for this case, we can see that xt and yt exhibit only an exponential decay
as the number of iterations t increases. Note that xt is the expectation of the root-
node bit-error probability taken over the possible outcomes of the tree ensemble T⃗t.
The dominating term in this expectation is the contribution of the worst-case trees,
namely, the trees that contain a long chain of nodes such that the only participating
variable nodes are the ones with the minimum left degree lmin. DDPs with lmin =
2 form a special case where the contribution by the worst-case trees decays only
exponentially fast in t.
5.3 Motivation for Large-Girth LDPC Codes
Suppose we are given a DDP (λ, ρ) with lmin ≥ 3. For k = 1,2,3, . . ., let (nk) be a
strictly increasing sequence of positive integers and let tk be such that
tk = ⌈
log lognk + log a − logβ
log(lmin − 1)
⌉
for any positive integer a. By Lemma 5.2, we have ytk = O (1/n
a
k). In particular,
we have yt = O (1/n3) for a = 3 (we drop the subscript k for convenience). Since
the density evolution estimate yt is only an approximation of the actual BER of the
standard ensemble, this does not necessarily mean that the actual bit-error probability
y(t, n) itself decays as O(1/n3). In particular, note that we want to analyze the BER
under BP decoding as the number of iterations t increases with n.
There are only a few rigorous results regarding the “closeness” of the density
evolution approximation and to our knowledge, none of these fit our requirement.
For example, we know the following results
 For G(n,λ, ρ)
lim
n→∞
x(t, n) = xt, lim
n→∞
y(t, n) = yt
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as long as t remains constant [34, Thm. 3.49]. We cannot use this result directly
since we let t grow with n.
 Korada and Urbanke [45] consider a randomly selected code Cn from G(n,λ, ρ)
and analyze the expected BER as the iteration count t(n) increases monotoni-
cally with the block length n. In particular, they show that
lim
n→∞
E (PBPb (Cn, ε, t(n))) = 0
whenever either of the following conditions are met.
1. The minimum variable-node degree is at least five and the channel param-
eter is below the threshold, i.e.,
lmin ≥ 5 ε < εth
2. The minimum variable-node degree is at least three and the channel pa-
rameter is below a quantity ε̄th, which is less than the threshold εth, i.e.,
lmin ≥ 3 ε < ε̄th
The above result states the regions where y(t, n) converges to zero when t is a
non-decreasing function of n. However, for our strong secrecy result, we must
also know that speed at which it converges to zero.
To achieve strong secrecy, we must find some ensemble Hn for which y(t, n) =
O(1/n3), where t is growing with n at least as fast as log logn. In general, this
is not true for G(n,λ, ρ). For example, any irregular DDP with lmin = 3 does not
satisfy y(t, n) = O(yt) any ε > 0. In particular, from one of the results by Orlitsky, et
al. [39, Thm. 16] we can infer that the following for the standard ensemble
y(t, n) ≥ lim
t→∞








for lmin ≥ 2 and ε < εth. This means that we require the minimum variable-node
degree lmin to be at least five for strong secrecy. However, this reduces the erasure
threshold εth to low values. From the discussion in Chapter 3, it is clear that we must
have very high values of εth to achieve strong secrecy at high rates. Our objective
is to achieve fast block-error (bit-error) decay and high thresholds simultaneously,
and the standard ensemble of LDPC codes is not adequate for these requirements.
Therefore, we must construct special ensembles of LDPC codes.
5.3.1 Strong Secrecy Using Large-Girth Regular LDPC Codes
Let Gg(n,λ, ρ) denote the subset of Tanner graphs in G(n,λ, ρ) whose girth is more
than g. Clearly, the level-t computation graphs of G4t(n,λ, ρ) are cycle free. This
means that any possible outcome of C̊t is also a possible outcome of T̊t; in other words,
the random trees C̊t and T̊t have the same “support.” This does not necessarily mean
that C̊t and T̊t are identically distributed and therefore, y(t, n) = yt is not necessarily
true for G4t(n,λ, ρ).
The regular LDPC code ensemble G4t(n,xc−1, xd−1) is a special case for which C̊t
and T̊t are equal to a unique tree T . This is because the girth condition forces the
two random variables to have the same support and the regularity of the code forces
that support to be of size one. Since y(t, n) is calculated from C̊t in the same way as
yt is calculated from T̊t, we have y(t, n) = yt. Using a similar reasoning, we can also
say that x(t, n) = xt.
In essence, density evolution analysis is approximate because it makes the follow-
ing assumptions.
1. The decoding neighborhood is a tree.
2. The node degrees in the decoding tree are independent.
For large-girth Tanner graphs, the first assumption is true. For large-girth regular
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Table 1: The validity of density evolution assumptions for different ensembles of
LDPC codes.
Ensemble C̊t is a tree? C̊t = T̊t statistically?
Standard enesemble 7 7
Large-girth irregular 3 7
Large-girth regular 3 3
Tanner graphs, there is a unique decoding neighborhood with only one choice for
variable-node degrees and only one choice for check-node degrees, and hence the
second assumption is also true. However, the second assumption is not justified for
large-girth irregular Tanner graphs. Therefore, we are able to assert that the density
evolution estimate is exact in the case of large-girth regular LDPC codes, but are
unable to do the same for the irregular counterpart. This means that large-girth
irregular LDPC codes require a much closer analysis to prove any strong secrecy
results.
Assume that there exists a sequence (C⊥n) of (c, d)-regular LDPC codes with c ≥ 3
such that their Tanner graphs have girth more than 4t, where
t = ⌈
log logn + log 3 − logβ
log(c − 1)
⌉








for ε < εth. Here, PBPb (C
⊥
n, ε, t) denotes the bit-error probability after t iterations. By
the above equation, the coset coding scheme using the dual sequence (Cn) will achieve
strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1 − εth.
5.3.2 Existing Constructions for LDPC Codes with High Girth
Construction of LDPC codes with high girth (not necessarily with logarithmic growth)
has received significant attention from the coding theory community. We know of the
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following constructions.
1. The progressive edge growth (PEG) algorithm by Hu, et al. [46] constructs
LDPC codes with a prescribed left (variable-node) degree distribution and rate.
The PEG algorithm, which is a greedy algorithm, starts with a Tanner graph
with no edges, and for each variable node, it chooses the farthest away check
node and adds an edge to it. If two check nodes are equidistant from the given
variable node, then the one with the least degree is chosen. In this way, edges
are added to satisfy all the left degree requirements.
The LDPC codes produced by PEG have a very good error-correcting perfor-
mance over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels, and empirical
evidence shows that PEG can create Tanner graphs with high girth even for
short block lengths. Under the assumption that the maximum right degree is
bounded, Hu, et al. [46] proved that PEG can create large-girth Tanner graphs.
However, we are unable to ascertain whether this assumption about the right
degrees is true. Therefore, we are unable to conclude that PEG is a large-girth
construction.
2. An algorithm to construct near-regular graphs with large-girth was proposed
by Chandran [47]. The ideas behind this algorithm are very similar to PEG.
For a given positive integer k and an arbitrarily large integer n, this algorithm
constructs a graph in n vertices with minimum degree k − 1, maximum degree
k+1 and average degree k such that the girth of the graph is lower-bounded by
logk(n) +O(1) as n increases.
The above algorithm was modified by Krishnan, et al. [48] to construct large-
girth near-regular LDPC codes. Given the integers c, d with 1 < c < d, and
increasing block length n, the modified algorithm constructs large-girth Tanner
graphs with variable-node degrees in the set {c− 1, c, c+ 1} with average c, and
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check-node degrees in the set {d − 1, d, d + 1} with average d.
3. For any odd number k ≥ 3 and a prime power q, Lazebnik and Ustimenko [49]
gave an algebraic construction of q-regular bipartite graphs on 2qk vertices with
girth at least k+5. It was later shown in [50] that this graph is disconnected and




⌋+1 vertices. The graphs produced by this algorithm
are large-girth graphs. Based on these graphs and their underlying algebraic
structure, Kim, et al. [51] constructed LDPC codes having asymptotically large
girth. It can be noted that the existing code constructions using this graph
produce codes that either have rate 1/q or have rate very close to 1.
4. Margulis [52] constructed 2r-regular graphs of girth at least c(logn)/(log r) on
n vertices for some constant c > 0. In the same work, he also outlined a method
to construct rate-12 regular LDPC codes using these graphs.
5. Based on Margulis’ idea, Rosenthal and Vontobel [53, 54] constructed large-
girth regular LDPC codes using the large-girth graphs by Lubotzky, Phillips
and Sarnak [55].
6. A construction of high girth regular LDPC codes was proposed by Gallager [38,
Appendix C] in his monograph. In his construction, a parity-check matrix is
built heuristically to avoid short cycles.
It can be noted that the above constructions produce only LDPC codes of specific
rates and specific (regular) degree distributions. For our problem, we require an
ensemble of large-girth LDPC codes with arbitrary irregular degree distributions and
to our knowledge, none of the prior constructions fit our requirement.
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5.4 LPS Graphs—Background
In [55], Lubotzky, Phillips and Sarnak published a construction of a family of regular
graphs that have the large-girth property. In this section, we provide a very brief
overview of these graphs; for a more detailed discussion, we point the reader to
the book by Davidoff, et al. [56]. We shall call these graphs LPS graphs, after the
inventors. LPS graphs belong to the class Cayley graphs. Given a group G and an
inverse-closed subset S of G, i.e., s−1 ∈ S, ∀s ∈ S, the Cayley graph Γ(G,S) is an
undirected simple graph defined as follows:
 The vertex set of Γ(G,S) is G.
 For any g ∈ G and s ∈ S, there is an edge between g and gs.
5.4.1 Construction
The LPS graphs Xp,q are defined for odd primes p and q with q > 2
√
p. To construct
Xp,q, one first chooses a set Sp,q with p + 1 elements from the projective linear group
PGL2(q) of invertible 2 × 2 invertible matrices over Fq. We will not discuss how Sp,q
is chosen, since it is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The LPS graph Xp,q is
constructed as follows.
1. If p is a quadratic residue modulo q, then Xp,q = Γ (PSL2(q), Sp,q).
2. If p is a quadratic non-residue modulo q, then Xp,q = Γ (PGL2(q), Sp,q).
Here PSL2(q) is the special linear group of 2 × 2 invertible matrices over Fq.
5.4.2 Properties
LPS graphs belong to the class of Ramanujan graphs, defined subsequently. The
adjacency matrix of a simple graph with n vertices is an n×n matrix [ai,j] such that
ai,j = 1 whenever vertices i and j are adjacent, and ai,j = 0 otherwise. Consider the
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eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix. For a k-regular graph, any eigenvalue µ is such
that ∣µ∣ ≤ k. A Ramanujan graph is a k-regular graph such that if µ is an eigenvalue
and ∣µ∣ ≠ k, then ∣µ∣ ≤ 2
√
k − 1.
LPS graphs also have the large-girth property, as noted by the following.
Theorem 5.3 ( [56, Thm. 4.2.2]). Let p, q be distinct, odd primes, with q > 2
√
p. The
graphs Xp,q are (p+ 1)-regular graphs that are connected and Ramanujan. Moreover,
1. If p is a quadratic residue modulo q, then Xp,q is a non-bipartite graph with
q(q2−1)
2 vertices, satisfying the girth estimate girth(X
p,q) ≥ 2 logp q
2. If p is a quadratic non-residue modulo q, then Xp,q is a bipartite graph with
q(q2 − 1) vertices, satisfying girth(Xp,q) ≥ 4 logp q − logp 4
The large-girth property of LPS graphs is independent of their Ramanujan prop-
erty. In fact, Ramanujan graphs containing loops exist [57].
5.4.3 Applications in Error-Correction Coding
LPS graphs have good expansion, which is a direct consequence of their Ramanujan
property. The expansion property of these graphs was used by Sipser and Spiel-
man [58] to construct asymptotically good LDPC codes that are also expanders. The
large-girth property of LPS graphs was used to construct large-girth LDPC codes by
Rosenthal and Vontobel [54].
5.5 Construction of Large-Girth Tanner Graphs
In this section, we will describe our construction of large-girth Tanner graphs for an
arbitrary DDP (λ, ρ). Our construction works for both regular and irregular DDPs


















Step 1 Step 2
Figure 24: An overview of the algorithm to construct large-girth LDPC codes.
The following is a high-level description of our algorithm (illustrated in Fig. 24).
Given a DDP (λ, ρ), we start with a sequence of large-girth (p + 1)-regular graphs
for a suitable integer p. In the first step, we use a well-known algorithm from the
graph theory community to convert these into bipartite graphs; we create a sequence
of large-girth (p + 1)-regular bipartite graphs from the given sequence of graphs. In
the second step, we use a node-splitting algorithm to create nodes of smaller degrees
in such a way that the resulting graph is a (λ, ρ) Tanner graph. For a given node of
degree (p + 1), we create new nodes and reassign some of the edges from the given
node to the newly created nodes. Note that in both the steps, we increase the number
of nodes linearly without decreasing the girth. This maintains the logarithmic growth
in the girth, thereby giving rise to a sequence of large-girth (λ, ρ) LDPC codes. Our
algorithm can start with any sequence of large-girth regular graphs and the results
in this chapter are true regardless of our starting sequence. For the sake of clarity,
we will only discuss the case where we start with LPS graphs.
5.5.1 Large-Girth Bipartite Graphs from Large-Girth Graphs
The first step in our algorithm is to create a large-girth (p + 1)-regular bipartite
graph from the LPS graph Xp,q. For this purpose, we make use of an algorithm from
the book Extremal Graph Theory by Bollobás [59]. This algorithm is outlined as
Algorithm 5.1 in this dissertation. Given a simple graph G, this algorithm creates a
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Figure 25: An illustration of Algorithm 5.1 to create bipartite graphs.
bipartite graph B(G) with twice the number of vertices and edges.
Algorithm 5.1 Constructing a bipartite graph given any graph [59, §3.1].
1: Given a graph G in n vertices, create an identical copy G′ with V (G)∩V (G′) = ∅.
Let f ∶ V (G)→ V (G′) be a graph homomorphism.
2: Create a graph H with vertex set V (H) = V (G) ∪ V (G′) and edge set E(H) =
{{x, y} ∶ x ∈ V (G), y ∈ V (G′), f(x) ∼ y in G′}. That is, if a1, b1 ∈ V (G),
a2 = f(a1), b2 = f(b1) and a1b1 ∈ E(G) (or equivalently, if a2b2 ∈ E(G′)), then
a1b2, a2b1 ∈ E(H).
Lemma 5.4. Given a graph G, if H = B(G) then girth(H) ≥ girth(G).
Proof. For any cycle C in H with the vertices in the order
(u0, v0, u1, v1, . . . , ur−1, vr−1, u0)
there exists a closed walk
W = (u0, f
−1(v0), u1, f
−1(v1), . . . , ur−1, f
−1(vr−1), u0)
in G. Note that r ≥ 2. We show that this closed walk W contains a cycle. We do
this by showing that while traversing W , we do not retrace an edge, i.e., we do not
encounter an edge twice in succession.
Suppose otherwise. Let vi be the vertex where we traceback. The sequence
ui, vi, u(i+1) mod r is such that ui = u(i+1) mod r. This is a contradiction since all the
vertices in the original cycle are distinct and r ≥ 2.
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Figure 26: An illustration of Algorithm 5.2 to split a vertex.
Therefore, W contains a cycle C∗. We have
length(C) ≥ length(C∗) ≥ girth(G)
which proves that girth(H) ≥ girth(G). Note that the second inequality in the above
equation follows from the fact that C∗ is a cycle in G.
5.5.2 Large-Girth Tanner Graphs from Large-Girth Regular Bipartite
Graphs
The Basic Node-Splitting Step
The basic step involved in creating vertices of smaller degrees from a given vertex
of larger degree is the node-splitting step, Algorithm 5.2. This step is illustrated in
Fig. 26, where a node of degree six is split into two nodes of degrees three each.
Algorithm 5.2 Splitting a vertex into vertices of smaller degrees.
1: Given a vertex v in a graph G, we partition the set of all its neighbors N(v) into
N1,N2, . . . ,Ns.
2: We create a new graph H by deleting v from G and adding new vertices
v1, v2, . . . , vs and connecting vi to the vertices in Ni for all i.
In this work, we will only consider the creation of equal sized partitions Ni in
Step 1 of Algorithm 5.2. Under this restriction, the partitioning of N(v) can be done
in two ways.
 Deterministic version. Let (e1, e2, . . . , eM) be a simple ordering of the edges
in G. If N(v) = {ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eisk} with i1 ≤ i2 ≤ ⋯ ≤ isk, we choose N1 =
{ei1 , ei2 , . . . , eik}, N2 = {eik+1 , eik+2 , . . . , ei2k}, etc.
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 Random version. The partitioning of N(v) is done in a random fashion.
Though the girth properties of the graphs obtained by both the versions of Algorithm
5.2 are similar, it is easier to count graphs of a particular configuration when we use
the deterministic version than when we use the random version. The deterministic
version will be used in our construction of irregular Tanner graphs. In the following
lemma, we show that node-splitting does not decrease girth.
Lemma 5.5. Given a graph G, if H is a graph obtained by splitting an arbitrary
vertex of G according to either version of Algorithm 5.2, then girth(H) ≥ girth(G).
Proof. Suppose H does not have any cycles. In this case, girth(H) = ∞ and the
lemma is true.
We are now left with the case where H has cycles. Consider any cycle C in H.
Let v be the vertex of G that is being split and let Vnew = {v1, v2, . . . , vs} be the set
of new vertices created. By traversing along C and identifying vertices vi with v, we
will get a closed walk W in G. We show that W contains a cycle.
If C has less than two vertices from the set Vnew, then W is a cycle and we are
done. Otherwise, C has at least two of these vertices. We can pick vi, vj such that
while traversing from one to the other along C, we don’t encounter any other vertices
from Vnew. Let this path (excluding vi, vj) be denoted by P . Since vi and vj are not
adjacent and N(vi) ∩N(vj) = ∅, this path has at least two vertices. Therefore, vPv
is a cycle C∗ in W that is smaller than C. Since G contains the cycle C∗, we have
length(C) ≥ length(C∗) ≥ girth(G), which shows that girth(H) ≥ girth(G).
Note that Algorithm 5.2 can sometimes create a disconnected graph. That is, H
may be disconnected even if G is connected. However, we can see that Lemma 5.5 is
valid regardless of any disconnections introduced by node splitting. Furthermore, the
proof of the main result in this chapter relies only on Lemma 5.5 and is valid even
though some of the Tanner graphs in our ensemble may be disconnected.
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Regular Bipartite Graphs with Arbitrary Degree
When p is a quadratic residue modulo q, we can use the construction in Algorithm
5.1 to generate a bipartite (p+1)-regular graph in q(q2−1) vertices with girth at least
2 logp q. Therefore, given primes p and q with q > 2
√
p, it is possible to construct a
(p + 1)-regular bipartite graph in q(q2 − 1) vertices with girth at least 2 logp q.
In our overall construction, we want to split the vertices of a k-regular graph into
vertices of smaller degree. It is easier to work with large-girth k-regular bipartite
graphs for arbitrary k, than it is with large-girth (p + 1)-regular bipartite graphs for
prime p. With this in mind, we propose Algorithm 5.3 to create the former from
the latter using node-splitting. In this algorithm, we first find an integer s such that
there exists a prime p with p + 1 = sk. Then, we split each vertex of the (p + 1)-
regular bipartite graph into s new vertices each to get a k-regular bipartite graph.
The existence of s (and p) is guaranteed by a corollary to the following.
Theorem 5.6 (Dirichlet’s Theorem on Arithmetic Progressions [60, Ch. 7]). Given
two positive integers a, b that are relatively prime, i.e., gcd{a, b} = 1, the sequence
(an + b)n∈N contains an infinite number of primes.
By observing that gcd{k, k − 1} = 1, we have the following.
Corollary 5.7. Given any positive integer k, there are infinite number of primes of
the form sk − 1, with s ∈ N.
Large-Girth Regular Tanner Graphs
Recall from §5.3.1 that for the case of large-girth regular LDPC codes, the security
result is straightforward. We provide Algorithm 5.4 to construct large-girth regular
Tanner graphs for a given left degree c and right degree d.
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Algorithm 5.3 Constructing large-girth k-regular bipartite graphs.
1: Given a positive integer k, find the smallest solution for s ∈ N such that p = sk−1
is a prime. The existence of s is guaranteed by Dirichlet’s Theorem on Arithmetic
Progressions. Denote sk − 1 by p.
2: Pick a sequence of primes greater than 2
√
p. For each such prime q, generate the
LPS graph Xp,q.
3: If p is a quadratic residue modulo q, then G = B(Xp,q). Otherwise, G = Xp,q.
In either case, G is an (sk)-regular bipartite graph on q(q2 − 1) vertices and
girth(G) ≥ 2 logp q.
4: Split each vertex of G successively into s vertices of degree k according to either
version of Algorithm 5.2. The resulting graph H is a k-regular bipartite graph
with sq(q2 − 1) vertices and girth(H) ≥ girth(G) ≥ 2 logp q.
Algorithm 5.4 Constructing large-girth (c, d)-regular bipartite graphs.
1: Let k = LCM{c, d}. Construct a sequence of k-regular bipartite graphs of large
girth according to Algorithm 5.3.
2: Given a k-regular bipartite graph G with sq(q2−1) vertices and girth(G) ≥ 2 logp q,
let (Vv, Vc) be the bipartition of the vertices. We have ∣Vv ∣ = ∣Vc∣ =
sq(q2−1)
2 .
3: Split each vertex in Vv into k/c new vertices of degree c each according to either
version of Algorithm 5.2 to get kc
sq(q2−1)
2 left vertices of degree c.
4: Split each vertex in Vc into k/d new vertices of degree d each according to either
version of Algorithm 5.2 to get kd
sq(q2−1)
2 right vertices of degree d. The resultant
graph H is a (c, d)-regular bipartite graph with girth(H) ≥ 2 logp q.
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Large-Girth Irregular Tanner Graphs
For an arbitrary sequence of large-girth irregular LDPC codes, we are unable to show
that the girth property directly implies a strong secrecy result. However, we are
able to prove the same for large-girth irregular LDPC codes constructed in a specific
manner, namely by Algorithm 5.5. In Algorithm 5.5, we create a large-girth k-regular
bipartite graph G according to Algorithm 5.3. Then, we randomly order the nodes
and split them into nodes of smaller degrees such that contiguous blocks give rise to
daughter nodes of identical degree.
5.6 Asymptotic BER of Large-Girth LDPC Codes
For a given DDP (λ, ρ), we can create a sequence of large-girth (λ, ρ)-irregular LDPC
codes (Cn) of increasing block-length n using Algorithm 5.5. We denote the large-girth
graphs associated with Cn by Rn.
Theorem 5.8. For a given DDP (λ, ρ) with minimum left degree lmin ≥ 3, the se-
quence of large-girth (λ, ρ)-irregular LDPC codes (Cn) created using Algorithm 5.5 is
such that whenever ε < εth we have
EPMPb (Cn, ε) = O (exp(−c1nc2)) (21)
for some positive constants c1, c2.
5.6.1 Proof of Theorem 5.8
The only sources of randomness in Algorithm 5.5 for a given large-girth graph G (at
the end of Step 3) are the permutation functions σ and π. The probability distribution
of Rn given G is easier to analyze than that of Rn when G is not specified. Clearly,
(21) is true whenever
E (PMPb (Cn, ε)∣G) = O (exp(−c1nc2)) (22)
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Algorithm 5.5 Constructing large-girth (λ, ρ) irregular bipartite graphs.
1: Let k be the least common multiple (LCM) of all the left and right degrees. Let
a be the smallest positive integer such that aλi, aρj ∈ N for all i, j.
2: Let s be the smallest natural number such that sak−1 is a prime number. Call this
prime number p. Choose an arbitrary prime q > 2
√
p. Construct an (ak)-regular
bipartite graph G0 according to Algorithm 5.3. The graph G0 has sq(q2 − 1)
vertices and girth(G0) ≥ 2 logp q.
3: Split each vertex of G0 into a vertices of degree k by successively applying Algo-
rithm 5.2 (either version) and denote the resulting k-regular bipartite graph by
G. The graph G has n0 vertices on the left and n0 vertices on the right, where
n0 =
asq(q2−1)
2 , and girth(G) ≥ 2 logp q.
4: Let (v1, v2, . . . , vn0) be some ordering of the “left” vertices in G and let
(c1, c2, . . . , cn0) be some ordering of the “right” vertices in G. Also, let
(e1, e2, . . . , en0k) be some ordering of the edges in G.
5: Let σ and π be two randomly chosen permutation functions over the set
{1,2, . . . , n0}.
6: Consider the ordered set (v′1, v
′




i = vσ(i). In this ordered set,
 split the first n0λlmin vertices into n0kλlmin/lmin vertices of degree lmin,
 split the next n0λlmin+1 vertices into n0kλlmin+1/(lmin + 1) vertices of degree
lmin + 1,
 ⋯
 split the last n0λlmax vertices into n0kλlmax/lmax vertices of degree lmax.
In the above, we split the vertices according to the deterministic version of Algo-
rithm 5.2.
7: Do a similar operation for the check nodes using the ordered set (c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
n0),








vertices and girth at least 2 logp q.
89
is true uniformly for all possible G in Step 3 of Algorithm 5.5.
Note that PMPb (Cn, ε) denotes the probability of bit-error after infinite iterations
of the MP algorithm (or equivalently, when a stopping set is encountered). This
probability is clearly less than the probability of bit-error after a finite number of
iterations. Therefore (22) is true whenever
E (PMPb (Cn, ε, t(n))∣G) ≤ A(n) = O (exp(−c1nc2)) (23)
is true for some function t(n). The role played by the quantity A(n) is to ensure that
we are able to upper bound the left hand side uniformly in G. We pick t(n) = a logn,
where a > 0 is such that girth(Rn) ≥ 4a logn + 2. We know that a exists because of
the large-girth property of Rn. Let amax be the maximum possible value for a.
Lemma 5.9. For any δ ∈ (0,1), there exists a natural number N , dependent only on
n,λ, ρ and δ, such that for all n ≥ N we have




where yt(n)(ε) is the quantity defined in Lemma 5.2.
We know from Lemma 5.2 that
yt(n)(ε) = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t(n)))
= O (exp(−βna log(lmin−1)))
The above equation, along with Lemma 5.9, completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 5.9. Consider the computation graph C̊t of Rn (we write t for t(n)
to simplify notation). Clearly, Pr(C̊t = T ) > 0 if and only if Pr(T̊t = T ) > 0.
Let T be any valid level-t tree in the sense that Pr(T̊t = T ) > 0. Let Pe(T, ε) be
the probability that the root node of T is in error when the tree code associated with
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T is transmitted over BEC(ε) and decoded with t iterations of the MP decoder. Note
the following two equations
yt(ε) =∑Pr(T̊t = T )Pe(T, ε)
E (PMPb (Cn, ε, t)∣G) =∑Pr(C̊t = T ∣G)Pe(T, ε)
From the above, we can see that the proof is complete once we show that for all large
enough n, we have
Pr(C̊t = T ∣G) ≤
1
1 − δ
Pr(T̊t = T )
Let T be a valid level-t tree with i0 being the degree of the root node. Let this
tree have pi variable nodes of degree i (including the root node, but excluding the
leaf nodes) and qj check nodes of degree j. We have













Now, consider C̊t. The probability that the root node v has degree i0 is clearly
Li0 . The i0 edges incident with v in Rn will correspond to i0 edges in G incident
with u, the parent node of v. Let b(1), b(2), . . . , b(i0) be the i0 neighbors of u in G
corresponding to those edges. Let c(1), c(2), . . . , c(i0) be the daughter nodes in Rn
corresponding to the same edges. The number of ways of choosing the permutation
function π such that node c(1) has degree j is equal to the number of ways of putting
b(1) into a slot that corresponds to degree j, which is n0ρj. Note that these slots
are numbered. Here, n0 = 2n/ (k ∫
1
0 λdx) is the number of left (right) vertices in G,
where k is the LCM of all the degrees in (λ, ρ).
In general, whenever T is a valid level-t tree, we have





























We note the following inequality.
(n0 − 1 −∑
lmax






(n0 −∑pi)(∑pi)−1 (n0 −∑ qj)∑ qj
(27)
















































0 Pr(T̊t = T ) (28)
Substituting (27) and (28) in (26), we get
Pr(C̊t = T ) <
Pr(T̊t = T )


















→ 1 as n→∞ (30)
First, we note that ∑pi and ∑ qj grow exponentially in t. Hence, there exist
constants α1, α2, β1, β2 > 0 such that
α1n













































For this, we pick the constant a ∈ (0, amax] small enough so that β2 < 0.5. Observe





















which goes to 1 as m→∞.
5.7 Strong Secrecy Region
The asymptotic decay of the bit-error probability achieved by the codes in Theo-
rem 5.8 is faster than the inverse cubic decay required for strong secrecy. This di-
rectly implies that the duals of the LDPC codes constructed by Algorithm 5.5 achieve
strong secrecy on the BEWC under the coset coding scheme.
For a given DDP (λ, ρ), we have constructed a sequence (Cn) of large-girth LDPC
codes based on Ramanujan graphs. For minimum left degree at least three, we showed
that for ε < εth, we have
EPMPb (Cn, ε) = O(exp(−βna log(lmin−1)))
the dual sequence (C⊥n) achieves strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1 − εth.
5.7.1 Difference Between Regular and Irregular Codes
For any large-girth regular LDPC code sequence (Cn), we have
PMPb (Cn, ε) = O (exp(−βn
a log(lmin−1)))
93
for ε < εth. This means that the dual sequence achieves strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ)
for ξ > 1 − εth.
For irregular codes constructed by Algorithm 5.5, we have shown that
E (PMPb (Cn, ε)) = O (exp(−βna log(lmin−1)))
for ε < εth. Note that our algorithm for irregular LDPC codes incorporates two
random permutation functions, thereby producing a random LDPC code. Moreover,
there must be at least one code whose bit-error rate is as good as, if not better than,
the above average bit-error rate. This means that there must exist codes in the dual
sequence that achieve strong secrecy on BEWC(ξ) for ξ > 1 − εth.
For the irregular code construction, we also have a concentration around the strong
secrecy behavior. For any integer k > 0 and a function f(n) = Θ(1/nk), we have the
following due to Markov’s inequality
Pr (Pb (Cn, ε) ≥ f(n)) ≤
EPb (Cn, ε)
f(n)
→ 0, as n→∞
This means as n increases, the irregular LDPC code output by our algorithm has
a bit-error rate O(1/nk) with very high probability. The concentration around the
strong secrecy behavior follows by setting k = 3.
Our result for regular LDPC codes is stronger than that that of irregular LDPC
codes. However, irregular LDPC codes are important because they have 1−εth closer
to their rate than regular LDPC codes. Therefore, irregular codes are instrumental
in achieving strong secrecy at higher rates compared to regular LDPC codes.
5.7.2 Comparison with Other LDPC Code Approaches
Thangaraj, et al. [1] introduced the LDPC code approach to achieve weak secrecy




(a) LDPC scheme Weak
(b) Short-cycle-free 
      LDPC scheme StrongWeak
(c) Large-girth 











Figure 27: A sketch of the secrecy regions achieved by (a) LDPC codes [1], (b)
short-cycle-free LDPC codes, and (c) large-girth LDPC codes.
achieves weak secrecy for ξ ∈ (1 − εth,1 − εef] and strong secrecy for ξ ∈ (1 − εef ,1].
The large-girth LDPC code approach in this chapter achieves strong secrecy for ξ ∈
(1 − εth,1], which is an improvement over the other two technique. Note that these
secrecy regions are valid only for LDPC code ensembles with lmin ≥ 3, i.e., minimum
degree at least three. The secrecy regions achieved by these three techniques is plotted
in Fig. 27
5.7.3 Gap Between Achievable Region and Secrecy Capacity
For a secret information rate R, we are interested in the minimum value of Eve’s
erasure probability ξ for which we can ensure strong secrecy over the BEWC using
our scheme. Since our proof works only for lmin ≥ 3, this involves finding an optimal
DDP of rate R and lmin ≥ 3 for which the BEC threshold εth is as high as possible. It
can be noted that εth < 1 − R. Most of the capacity achieving DDP sequences require
lmin = 2 (e.g., the tornado sequence and the right regular sequence in [61]). Therefore,
there is a small gap between the strong secrecy rate achievable by our technique and
the secrecy capacity of the BEWC.
For example, when we performed a search on LDPCOPT [42], an online database,
95
for R = 0.5 and lmin ≥ 3, we found that an optimal value of εth = 0.4619 is achieved
by the DDP λ(x) = 0.9043388x2 + 0.03300419x16 + 0.01434268x17 + 0.03535427x18 +
0.01296008x99 , ρ(x) = x10. This means that the duals of the LDPC codes constructed
using Algorithm 5.5 will achieve a strong secrecy rate of 0.5 over BEWC(ξ) for all
ξ > 0.5381. Note that for ξ close to 0.5381, the secrecy capacity of the BEWC is close
to 0.5381. Our coding scheme will achieve a secrecy rate of 0.5 over this channel,




Information-theoretic security is the technique of achieving information security by
leveraging the randomness in real-world communication channels. This notion of se-
curity is relatively new and judging by the number of technical papers published in
this topic, information-theoretic security has been attracting growing interest. How-
ever, most of the research work in this topic are very theoretical in nature and there
are few immediate practical applications of information-theoretic security. Neverthe-
less, understanding theoretical problems is an important initial step towards practical
implementations. In this dissertation, we have studied the problem of designing se-
cure encoders that offer information-theoretic security. This work borrows ideas from
the design and analysis of error-correcting codes for noisy channels.
6.1 Contributions
In this dissertation, we deal with the problem of designing secure encoders for a
special case of the wiretap channel, namely, the binary erasure wiretap channel. The
security criterion in our work, namely, information-theoretic strong secrecy, leads us
to a related problem of finding certain good channel codes. It was shown in Chapter 3
that code sequences that achieve O ( 1n2 ) block-error rate or O (
1
n3
) bit-error rate over
the binary erasure channel can be used to design encoders for strong secrecy over the
binary erasure wiretap channel.
In Chapter 4, we showed that certain short-cycle-free low-density parity-check
codes achieve the required O ( 1n2 ) asymptotic decay in block-error rate. Further, we
showed that these codes form an asymptotically significant fraction, which means
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that a Monte Carlo algorithm may be used to find these codes.
In Chapter 5, we designed LDPC codes with girth growing logarithmically in
block-length. Our explicit construction is based on the large-girth regular graphs
invented by Lubotzky, Phillips, and Sarnak [55]. We showed that LDPC codes
constructed in this manner achieve a sub-exponential asymptotic bit-error rate of
O (exp (−c1nc2)), with c1 > 0 and 0 < c2 < 1, over the binary erasure channel for
erasure probabilities below the erasure threshold. These codes satisfy the sufficient
condition required for strong secrecy over the binary erasure wiretap channel. We
also showed that the strong secrecy region achieved by these codes is a significant
improvement over the technique outlined in Chapter 4.
6.2 Future Directions
The following are some of the immediate directions where our work can be extended.
6.2.1 Closing the Gap to Secrecy Capacity
The large-girth LDPC codes designed in this dissertation have minimum variable-node
degree at least three. We argued in §5.7.3 that we may be able to use LDPC codes
with minimum variable-node degree two to achieve secrecy capacity. The intuition
behind this idea is that these a standard ensemble of these LDPC codes has a bit-
error threshold εth very close to 1 − R, where R is the code rate—such codes are the
so-called “capacity achieving” LDPC codes [61]. However, we use the block-error
threshold for our strong secrecy result and these codes do not have a block-error
threshold for the BEC [39, Thm. 17]. It has been suggested [62] that we may be able
to design special ensembles of LDPC codes with minimum variable-node degree two
to get a block-error threshold. One of the means of doing this is to use ideas behind
multi-edge-type LDPC codes [34, §7.1], [63]. One of the setbacks of considering special
ensembles is that they have different thresholds compared to the standard ensemble,
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which means that finding capacity achieving multi-edge-type LDPC codes is highly
non-trivial. Multi-edge-type LDPC codes are still not well-understood and to our
knowledge, there are no capacity-achieving multi-edge-type LDPC codes, excepting
certain designs [25] that don’t fit our strong secrecy requirement. The area of multi-
edge-type LDPC codes is a promising field that requires significant research and we
believe these codes will play a role in information-theoretic security.
6.2.2 Coding Techniques for Other Wiretap Models
The LDPC code strategy presented in this dissertation achieves strong secrecy only
for the binary-erasure wiretap channel. This is because, the security analysis uses
a linear algebra approach that is tailored for this channel model. For cases with a
noiseless main channel and a binary memoryless wiretap, we proposed an erasure
decomposition approach in §3.1.2. However, this approach achieves low secrecy rates.
Better secrecy rates are achieved [37] for binary symmetric wiretaps with a more
direct approach. In this respect, the polar coding approach [29] is more attractive
since it achieves secrecy capacity for all wiretap models with a noiseless main channel.
For wiretap models with a noisy main channel, we are not aware of any current
techniques that achieve strong secrecy. One coding approach for these channels is
to use an outer channel code to correct errors on the main channel. This approach
was used by Rathi, et al. [25] to achieve weak secrecy on a wiretap model with a
BEC main channel and an independent BEC wiretap channel, where they modify the
LDPC coding approach in [1] to correct errors on the main channel. Achieving strong




LARGE-GIRTH LDPC CODES OVER BMSCS
In Chapter 5, we designed large-girth LDPC codes whose BER decays as O (−c1nc2)
with growing block length n when they are transmitted over a BEC with the erasure
parameter below the threshold. In this chapter, we will show an analogous result
when these codes are transmitted over a class of binary-input memoryless symmetric-
output channels (BMSCs) when the channel parameter is below the threshold for the
given class.
A.1 Fundamentals
In this section, we give a quick introduction of LDPC codes over arbitrary BMSCs.
In particular, we provide an overview of the notion of L-densities and the density-
evolution analysis of LDPC codes using L-densities. This section is based on the
discussion in the Modern Coding Theory textbook [34, Ch. 4].
We consider BMSCs whose output alphabet is the extended real number line
defined as follows.
Definition A.1 (BMSC). A binary-input memoryless symmetric-output channel, de-
noted by X Ð→ Y is a memoryless channel whose input alphabet is {−1,1} and output
alphabet is R̄ = R∪{−∞,+∞}, such that its transition probability, given by the condi-
tional probability density function (pdf) pY ∣X(y∣x), follows the symmetry requirement
pY ∣X(y∣1) = pY ∣X(−y∣ − 1), ∀y ∈ R̄
▼
Clearly, any BMSC is uniquely defined by its transition probability pY ∣X(y∣x).
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A.1.1 L-Density Representation of BMSCs
The log-likelihood ratio (LLR) function l(y) of a BMSC is defined as
l(y) = ln
pY ∣X(y∣1)
pY ∣X(y∣ − 1)
Suppose a single random bit X is transmitted over the BMSC, which outputs the
random variable Y . Let the LLR random variable L be defined as L = l(Y ). It can
be shown [34, Lemma 4.7] that L is a sufficient statistic for decoding.
A.1.2 BP Decoding of LDPC Codes
The BP decoder for LDPC codes transmitted over a BMSC works as follows.
1. At iteration t = 0, all the variable nodes send the LLR associated with the
corresponding channel observation over their incident edges.
2. At iteration t > 0, the following two steps take place in this order.
(a) Check-node processing: Along each incident edge, a check node sends
the message Lout, which is calculated based on the incoming messages along












(b) Variable node processing: Along each incident edge, a variable node
sends the LLR message Lout, which is the sum of the incoming LLR mes-
sages L1,L2, . . . ,Lj−1 along the other edges and the channel output LLR
Lchannel. That is,
Lout = Lchannel +L1 +L2 +⋯ +Lj−1 (35)
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3. At the last iteration, the usual check-node processing takes place, following
which a hard-decision estimate of the transmitted bit is calculated at each vari-
able node. At a degree j variable node, the following is calculated.
Lfinal = Lchannel +L1 +L2 +⋯ +Lj
The hard-decision output X̂ is calculated as follows.
(a) If Lfinal > 0, X̂ = 1
(b) If Lfinal < 0, X̂ = −1
(c) If Lfinal = 0, X̂ is either −1 or 1 based on the outcome of a fair coin flip.
In this chapter, we will only consider the BP decoder with the flooding schedule
(§4.1.3).
A.1.3 Density Evolution Analysis
Due to the symmetry of the BMSC, the BP decoder for LDPC codes can be ana-
lyzed by assuming that the all-one codeword (considering the alphabet {−1,1}) is
transmitted. According to density evolution analysis, the BP decoder performance
for LDPC codes closely follows the BP decoder performance for codes associated with
tree ensembles. Therefore, it is enough to analyze the pdfs of the LLR messages sent
along the edges during BP decoding of the tree codes.
L-density
Since the all-one codeword from the tree code was assumed to be transmitted, the
corresponding conditional pdfs of all LLR messages are considered. This conditional
pdf is given a special name—L-density. The L-density associated with the channel
observation is denoted by aBMSC(z). Given the channel observation LLR Lchannel, the
L-density aBMSC(z) is the conditional pdf pLchannel∣X(z∣1). The L-density aBMSC(z) is
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a channel characteristic that plays an important role in analyzing the performance of
codes under iterative decoding.
Considering the BP decoder for the tree code over the given BMSC, let at(z) be
the L-density of the variable-to-check message at the tth iteration and let bt(z) be the
L-density of the check-to-variable message at the tth iteration.
Check Node Analysis
Given two LLRs L1,L2 with L-densities a1, a2, we define the operation  as the
follows: the result of a1 a2 is equal to the L-density of the random variable L3, and











That is, a3 = a1 a2 is the L-density of L3. It can be easily noted that the  operator
is both commutative and associative.
Consider a degree-k check node at the check-node processing stage of iteration
t > 0. The incoming messages are i.i.d. with L-density at−1. The outgoing message
along the kth edge is calculated using (34). Therefore, the L-density of the outgoing
message will be






Since we are considering the tree-ensemble, the degree of a check node is a random





t−1 ≜ ρ(at−1) (36)
Variable Node Analysis
At the 0th iteration of BP decoding, the variable nodes send the channel output LLRs.
Therefore, the L-density of the variable-to-check messages at the 0th iteration is equal
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to the L-density of the channel. That is,
a0(z) = aBMSC(z)
Consider a degree-j variable node at the variable-node-processing stage of iteration
t > 0. The incoming messages are i.i.d. with L-densities equal to bt−1(z). Since the
processing in (35) involves the addition of LLRs, the L-density of Lout is given by
the convolution of all the associated L-densities. In the case of a degree-j node, it is
given by
aout = aBMSC ⊛ bt−1 ⊛ bt−1 ⊛⋯⊛ bt−1
´¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¸¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¹¶
(j−1) times
= aBMSC ⊛ b
⊛(j−1)
t−1
where a⊛i denotes the convolution of a with itself i times.
In the tree ensemble, the probability distribution of the degree of a non-root
variable node is given by λ. Therfore, we have







= aBMSC ⊛ λ(bt−1)
Using (36), we get the recursive equation
at = aBMSC ⊛ λ(ρ(at−1)) (37)
BER Estimate
Consider the root node of T̊t(λ, ρ) in the final iteration. The L-density of the final
LLR Lfinal of the root node is given by







with Lj being the fraction of degree-j variable nodes in the LDPC code.
The probability of error in the hard-decision decoding is given by the error prob-
ability functional of the L-density of Lfinal. The error probability functional of a
symmetric L-density a is defined as










where L is a random variable with L-density a. It can be noted that the probability
of error of the root node of T̊t(λ, ρ) after t iterations of belief propagation is given by
PBPT̊t(λ,ρ)
(aBMSC) = E(ct)










The Bhattacharyya functional is used in our analysis because it is easier to track
when the operations ⊛ and  are performed than the error functional. We know the
following result for the operation ⊛.
Lemma A.2 ( [34, Lemma 4.63]). Let a and b be two L-densities. Then B(a⊛ b) =
B(a)B(b)
For the operation , we derive the following result using some of the ideas from
Lentmaier, et al. [44].
Lemma A.3 (Based on [44, Appendix I]). Let a and b be two L-densities. Then
B(a b) ≤B(a) +B(b)
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Proof. Let L1,L2 be random variables distributed according to a, b. Note that the

























1 − tanh (L32 )























The proof is complete once we show that








≤ (e−L1/2 + e−L2/2)
2
The LHS of the above equation can be written as




















(1 + e−L1)(1 + e−L2) − (1 − e−L1)(1 − e−L2)




≤ e−L1 + e−L2
≤ (e−L1/2 + e−L2/2)
2
A.1.4 Double Exponential Decay of the Estimated Error Probability
Theorem A.4. For a given DDP (λ, ρ) with minimum left degree lmin ≥ 3,
PBPT̊t(λ,ρ)
(aBMSC) = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t)) as t→∞
whenever the channel parameter is below the threshold value.
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Proof of the theorem




































Summarising the above, we have the following two inequalities.
B(ρ(a)) ≤ (ravg − 1)B(a) (39)
B(λ(a)) ≤ (B(a))
lmin−1 (40)
Recall that the density evolution recursion is given by
at = aBMSC ⊛ λ(ρ(at−1))
ct = aBMSC ⊛L(ρ(at−1))












where A ≜ B(aBMSC)(ravg − 1)lmin−1 is a positive quantity that depends only on the
channel and the DDP (λ, ρ).
Since the channel parameter of the BMSC is “below” the threshold, we have







for any L-density a.
Since B(at)→ 0, there exists an R ∈ N such that











Claim A.5. For i ≥ 0, we have B(aR+i) ≤ zR+i.
Proof. We prove this by induction. The base case is for i = 0 and it is true by our
choice of R.
Assume that the claim is true for some i ≥ 0. We have
B(aR+i+1) ≤B(aBMSC) ((ravg − 1)B(aR+i))
lmin−1
≤B(aBMSC) ((ravg − 1)zR+i)
lmin−1
= zR+i+1
This proves the claim.
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lmin−2 exp (−αR(lmin − 1)
i)
Due to our choice of R, αR ≜
−1
lmin−2 logA − log zR is positive. For t ≥ R, we have
zt = A
−1











lmin−2 exp (−β(lmin − 1)
t)
Note that β ≜ αR(lmin−1)R > 0. Therefore, we have
B(at) = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t)) as t→∞
It is easy to see that the following is true.
B(ct) ≤ A(B(at−1))
lmin−1
This inequality is analogous to (41) and therefore we can repeat the above proof to
show that
B(ct) = O (exp(−β(lmin − 1)
t)) as t→∞
Theorem A.6. For a given DDP (λ, ρ) with minimum left degree lmin ≥ 3, the
sequence of large-girth (λ, ρ)-irregular LDPC codes (Cn) created using Algorithm 5.5,
when transmitted over an arbitrary BMSC with its L-density aBMSC below the threshold
in the channel class, achieve an expected probability of bit-error that decays as
EPMPb (Cn, aBMSC) = O (exp(−c1nc2)) (42)
for some positive constants c1, c2.
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Proof. Given Theorem A.4, the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 5.8.
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